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ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of three essays, which are concerned with 
policies for economic situations characterized by informationally 
weak buyers. 
The first and third are in related areas. They examine how 
the equilibrium distribution of market prices is affected when 
consumers are unimformed about various aspects of the market. The 
classical explanation of how competitive equilibrium can persist 
relies heavily on all consumers being perfectly informed about the 
prices offered in the market. The first essay generalizes the model 
due to Wilde and Schwartz (1979) which introduced the notion that a 
sufficient proportion of consumers need to be comparing prices in 
order that a competitive equilibrium obtains. They showed this under 
strong assumptions about cost and demand functions. Here, the result 
is · generalized to allow downward sloping demand and U-shaped cost 
curves. Some comparative stitics are developed. 
The second essay uses the simple techniques of optimization 
to assess how well the remedies of lost profits, market damages and 
specific performance compensate the seller when a buyer breaches a 
contract. The conclusion is that in general lost profits overcom-
pensates, and market damages undercompensates; while specific 
performance always compensates exactly. The merits of these remedies 
on the basis of economic efficiency and implementation costs are 
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also dicussed. 
The final essay explores how heterogeneous product markets 
behave when consumers are imperfectly informed about quality. Three 
models are introduced with varying assumptions about the nature of 
the lack of information about quality among consumers. If consumers 
can gain information about quality as they shop, then a large enough 
proportion of shoppers is sufficient to guarantee a competitive 
outcome. The critical proportion required is less when a larger 
proportion of consumers is naturally informed. Lastly, if the state 
of information does not improve with shopping, competitive outcomes 
can be generated only by educating the consumers. 
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A GENERALIZED MODEL OF PRICING FOR 
HOMOlit:.NEOUS GOODS UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION 
1. INTRODUCIION 
In a paper published in the Review of Economic Studies in 
1979, Wilde and Schwartz explored the extent to which buyers must 
comparison shop in order that the market generate competitive or 
near-competitive prices. The model developed in that paper made 
strong assumptions about the nature of consumers' demand curves and 
firms' production technologies. The primary purpose of this paper is 
to explore whether the conclusions of Wilde and Schwartz are robust to 
the relaxation of those assumptions. Formally it is similar to 
Braverman's (1980} extension of Salop and Stiglitz's (1977) model of 
monopolistically competitive price dispersion. 
The basic Wilde and Schwartz model posits two types of buyers, 
those who buy from the first store they enter and those who buy from 
the store offering the lowest price among a sample of n stores (where 
n 2 2). All buyers demand exactly one unit of the good and all have a 
common limit price above which they demand zero units. Firms are 
identical. Each has a fixed cost of production, a constant marginal 
cost and a capacity constraint. In equilibrium, free entry forces all 
firms to earn zero expected profits. 
Wilde and Schwartz show that if sufficiently many buyers 
comparison shop (where "sufficient" is defined in terms of the 
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underlying parameters of the model), then a competitive outcome 
obtains. With slightly fewer comparison shoppers, a few firms deviate 
to high prices but most remain at the competitive price. Eventually, 
as the number of comparison shoppers continues to fall, prices are 
fully dispersed above the competitive price, and ultimately converge 
to the monopoly price. In their model, the monopoly price coincides 
with the monopolistically competitive price because of the "step-
function" demand curves. 
Th1s paper consists of two parts. The first demonstrates that 
the qualitative properties of the above results hold under more 
general conditions; in particular, they hold for typical, downward 
sloping demand curves and for any u-shaped average cost curves. The 
primary difference is that while the highest price in any 
noncompetitive equilibrium is again the monopolistically competitive 
price, in this case it is less than the monopoly price. The second 
part investigates properties of demand curves and average cost curves 
which make the competitive outcome more or less likely. In it we 
argue that the critical proportion of comparison shoppers needed to 
generate a competitive equilibrium falls as demand becomes more 
elastic or average costs become more inelastic. 
2 • 11IE GENERALlZEJJ MODEL 
Each period a large group of buyers enters the market. The 
group is partitioned into two types, ~ and An where 1-a is the 
proportion of the total who are of type ~ and a is the proportion who 
3 
are of type A • The members of A sample exactly n firms (n 2 2) and 
n n 
then buy from the firm offering the lowest price among those they have 
sampled. Members of A
1 
do not comparison shop, but instead buy from 
the first firm they sample. At the start of a new period the previous 
period's buyers exit with their purchases (or a "rain check") and a 
fresh group of buyers with the same G ratio arrive. Each consumer has 
a demand curve f(p), with f'(p) < 0. 
Firms exist over time and maximize expected profits by 
choosing the price at which to sell. All firms are identical, with 
total variable costs T(q) and fixed costs F. We shall assume 
increasing marginal costs, T"(q) > 0, to generate u-shaped average 
cost curves. Let A(q) = [T(q) + F]/q be the average cost curve and s 
be the capacity which min1mizes it. In equilibrium all firms earn 
zero expected profits since higher profit levels are eroded away by 
entry. Thus the consumer/firm ratio, denoted by a, is endogenous to 
the model. We define a1 as the type ~ to firm ratio, which is thus 
equal to a(l-G). Similarly an= aG. Equilibrium is then defined in 
the usual way-- a price distribution and a consumer/firm ratio such 
that all firms earn zero expected profits and no firm can make 
positive profits by changing its price, given the prices of other 
firms. Two technical assumptions complete the model. We require that 
it is feasible for firms to be able to enter this market; i.e., there 
is a consumer/firm ratio a such that A(af(p)) ~ p. We will also 
assume that for any a ) 0, af(p) intersects the average cost curve at 
most twice. This assumption preserves the essence of the 
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generalization but keeps the mathematics tractable. 
The generalized model yields the following theorem, which is 
proved in the appendix. 
Theorem: Under the assumptions described above, 
• ( i) a unique single price equilibrium occurs at p = A(s) --
the competitive equilibrium -- if and only if 
f(A(s)) A-l(p) 
a 2 1 - s f(p) • for all p 2 p 
where A-1 (p) refers to the left-hand branch of A; 
(ii) a unique nondegenerate equilibrium G(p), with a mass 
• point at p , occurs if and only if 
_ __;::;.s __ - 1 
aNf(p *> 
__ 1__ f(A(s)) A-l(p) 
n-1 < a < 1 - s f(p) for some p. 
In this case 
• 0 p < p 
• • G(p ) p i p 
G(p) = 
A-l~P~ 
__ 1 __ 
N _1 __ n-1 
~ p ~ 1 f(p) - a (1-a) aNa 
1 Pu < P 
where aN is the largest consumer/firm ratio such that 
and p is defined by 
u 




• • In the definition of G(p), G(p ) is the size of the mass point at p . . ,.., 
and is the maximum price such that > p and G(p ) = G( ); i.e. it 
is deiined by 
• G(p ) = 1 - A-
1 tp .... ) N 
f ( ) - a ( 1-a) 
_1_ 
_1_ n-1 
N a a 
(iii) a unique nondegenerate equilibrium G(p), with no mass 
point, occurs if and only if 




= 1 f(p) 
1 
---=-s __ - 1 
aNf(p•) 







p < pl 
pl ~ P ~ Pu 
pu < p 
where aN and p are as in case (ii) and p is defined by u 1 
where A-1 (p) refers to the left-hand branch of A(q). 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The qualitative properties of the equilibria described in the 
theorem are much the same as those derived in the earlier Wilde and 
Schwartz model. The conditions for each case seem complicated but can 
6 
be eas1ly understood by the use of some simple diagrams. 
In the generalizea model, the underlying structural features 
are summarized by the individual demand curve f(p) and the average 
cost curve A(q). Expected demand facing any firm will always be 
proportional to f(p). For example, consider the competitive 
equilibrium. In the competitive equilibrium all firms charge 
* -1 * p =minimum average cost, and produce s units, where s =A (p ). 
Firms enter until all make zero expected profits. Since firms all 
* charge p , each gets an equal share of the consumers. Hence if the 
consumer/firm ratio is a, each faces an expected demand curve of 
af(p). Zero profits at (p * ,s) thus requires * af(p ) = s. This defines 
c the competitive consumer/firm ratio (see Figure 1). a , 
Now suppose the consumer firm ratio is c and all firms a 
* produce s units priced at p Whether this is an equilibrium depends 
on the potential for making positive profits by deviating. If a firm 
* raises its price above p , it loses all shoppers. Since nonshoppers 
comprise (1-a) of the population, a deviant faces an expected demand 
c * curve given by (1-a)a f(p) for prices greater than p Figure 1 also 
illustrates this demand curve. Positive profits are possible for the 
deviant firm if and only if (1-a)acf(p) intersects the average cost 
curve. The condition that it does not -- a necessary condition for 
c competitive equilibrium -- is therefore that A[(1-a)a f(p)] L p, or 
(1-a)acf(p) L A-1 (p), where A-1 is defined on the left-hand branch of 
A(q). But aC = s/f(p*) = s/f(A(s)). Hence the critical constraint 
on shoppers is 
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• for all p 2 p 
Now suppose condition (1) is not met. This means 
(1) 
(1- a)acf(p) intersects A(q). Firms will then enter at prices above 
• p • This will reduce a and shift the curve (1 - a)af(p) to the left. 
When it is just tangent to A(q) no further profitable entry is 
possible. Call the associated consumer/firm ratio aN (see Figure 2). 
It is shown in the appendix that mass points are only possible 
at p•. Hence (1- a)aNf(p) describes the expected demand of the firm 







A ( sl• p* L-----4-~ ...... ~ 
(1- cr +ern) aN f(p) 




by derin1tion be at the tangency point between (1- a)aNf(p) and A(q); 
i.e., 
and 
N -1 a (1- a)f(p) ~A (p) for all p 2 psup* • 
Th1s is also illustrated in Figure 2. Note that p is the traditional 
u 
monopolistically competitive price for this environment. 
The next issue is whether or not the noncompetitive 
• equilibrium has a mass point at p • If there is no mass point, then 
the firm offering the lowest price faces no potential competitors. 
N N N N Hence that firm's expected demand is [a1 + nan]f(p) where a1 = (1-a)a 
N N N and a = aa; i.e., 1ts expected demand is (1- a+ na)a f(p). Figure 
n 
2 illustrates this curve. Clearly an equilibrium of this type is 
N * impossible if (1 - a + na)a f(p ) > s (i.e. if the expected demand 
curve cuts A(q) to the right of s), since in that case zero profits 
would require the firm offering the lowest price to produce at a 
quantity greater than s. This cannot be profit maximizing. Thus, the 
condition (1- a+ na)aNf(p*) > s implies a mass point exists 
(necessarily at p*). If it does not hold, i.e. (1- a+ na)aNf(p) 
intersects A(q) to the left of s, or 
a~ 
s - 1 
_1_ ( 2) 
N * n-1 
, 
a f(p ) 
then G(p
1
) given by (1 
N -1 
= 0 and p1 is 
- a + na)a f(p1
) = A (pl). 
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• If (1) and (2J do not ho!d, then firms "mass up" at p • As in 
• the Wilde and Schwartz model, a gap then appears between p and the 
next lowest price, (these are prices which are too low to compensate 
• the deviant firm for the loss of most shoppers to firms charging p ). 
Above firms are continuously distributed up to and including the 
monopolistically competitive price p • 
u 
3. CHANGES IN f(p) and A(q). 
One of the important features of the model developed by Wilde 
and Schwartz, and generalized herein, is that it allows for 
competitive equilibria even if all consumers are not perfectly 
inrormed. As a result, the model has turned out to be very useful as 
the basis tor a normative analysis of interventions in consumer 
product and financial markets. In particular, it provides a set of 
criteria for determining when a market is likely to be competitive, 
and a characterization of the form noncompetitive outcomes are likely 
to take (Schwartz and Wilde, 1979). The usefulness of the present 
generalization, beyond showing the basic model is robust, is to be 
able to relate properties of demand curves and average cost curves to 
the likelihood that a market operating under conditions of imperfect 
inrormation will be competitive. 
Initially, consider changes in average costs. Suppose that s . , 
and A(s) • p remain constant, but that lA (q)l increases. In other 
words, hold minimum effic1ent scale ana the competitive price 
constant, but let the average cost curve get ''steeper.n (This is 
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represented by the shift from A(q) to A(q) in ~igure 3.) 
The necessary and sufficient condition for a competitive 
equilibrium is equivalent to requiring that a~f(p) and A(q) not 
intersect. Clearly this is more likely when A(q) is steeper (holding 
sand A(s) constant). Thus a less elastic cost curve makes the single 
• price equilibrium at p more likely. It also reduces the dispersion 
of prices in the noncompetitive equilibrium since p will fall (see 
u 
N Figure 4 and recall that pu is defined by the tangency between a1f(p) 
and the average cost curve). 
If we perturb demand opposite results obtain. In part1cular 
the more elastic demand is, the more likely it is that a competitive 
equllibrium obtains. This can be seen best with an example using 
constant elasticity demand curves. 
Let f(p) = &p-r. Then the necessary and sufficient condition 
for a competitive outcome becomes 
or 
a 2. 1 -
• for all p 2. p 
• for all p 2. p 
For all p such that the right hand side of this inequality is not 
negative (essentially p ~ pu), it must be that ~n increase in y makes 
• the inequality more likely to be satisfied since p > A(s) = p • 
Again, a more elastic demand curve also implies less price dispersion 
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This paper has shown that the qualitative properties of the 
model developed by Wilde and Schwartz are robust to the strong 
assumptions regarding the nature of consumers' demand curves and 
firms' average cost curves used 1n that model. Furthermore, it has 
shown that the critical level of comparison shoppers needed to 
generate a competitive equilibrium falls as a demand becomes more 
elastic or average costs become more inelastic. 
The model also strengthens the connections between equilibrium 
search moaels and traditional models of monopolistic competition. 
When the necessary and sufficient condition for a competitive 
equilibrium is not met, prices will be dispersed over some range up to 
and including the monopolistically competitive price. This last 
result is important because it qualifies the somewhat pessimistic 
aspects of Wilde and Scnwartz (1979). In that model, if there is any 
price dispersion at all, some firms will necessarily charge the 
monopoly price. This means that some nonshoppers will be "fully 
exploited" in the sense that they receive no surplus from purchasing 
the good. In the generalized model the highest price charged will 
never exceed the monopolistically competitive price. In other words 
when imperfect information generates noncompetitive outcomes, they are 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix will prove the theorem stated in the text 
through a sequence of lemmas similar to those found 1n Wilde and 
Schwartz (1979). We initially consider some candidate equilibrium 
distribution of prices G(p) defined on [p
1
,pu]. 
* Lemma 1: G(p) cannot contain any mass points except possibly at p • 
Proof: The proof of this lemma is stated for the case of n 2. The 
generalization to arbitrary n will then be obvious. 
Suppose there is a mass point at some p0 > p*. Expected 
demand at p0 by members of ~ is given by 
(Al) 
where G(p0) is the size of the mass point at p0 • Here a2 is the 
expected number of shoppers who sample the firm, 1 - G(p0) is the 
probability that the other. firm they sample has a higher price, G(p0 ) 
is the probability that the other firm has the same price and, in this 
case, ! represents the probability that the shopper buys from the 
first firm. Finally, we multiply by two since the draws could occur 
in either order. 
Thus 
0 Expected demand by members of A1 is just a1f(p ). 
(A2) 
Now, consider a firm which charges a price of p0 - s where 
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e > 0 is such that p0 - e > p•. Since G can have at most a countable 
number of mass points, it is possible to find e such that no mass 
point occurs at p0 - e. Hence a firm which offers p0 - e faces an 
expected demand equal to 
0 0 0 D(p - e) = £a1 + 2a2 [1-G(p - e)]}f(p -e) 
> £a1 + 2a2 LG(p
0 > T 1 - G(p0 )]}f(p0 ) . (A3) 
0 0 Let q = min{s,[a1+ + 2a2 (G(p) + 1- G(p ))]f(p)}. Then, from (A3), 
q < D(p0 - e). 
Now, suppose the firm charging p0 - e sells q units (it might 
want to sell more). In this case 
n(po,D(pO)) = D(pO)[pO- A(D(pO))] 
n(p0 - e,q) = q[p0 - e - A(q)] • 
Subtracting (AS) from (A4), 
(A4) 
(AS) 
n(p0 ,D(p0)) - n(p0 - e,q) = D(p0)[p0 - A(D(p0))] - q[p0 - e- A(q)J 
= p0 LD(p0 ) - q] + eq- D(p0 )A(D(p0 )) + qA(q) 
= p0 [D(p0 ) - q] + eq- A(D(p0))[D(p0 ) - q] + q[A(q) - A(D(p0 ))] 
= [p0 - A(D(p0))][D(p0 ) - q] + sq + q[A(q) - A(D(p0))] . 
But p0 A(D(p0 )) since if G(p) is an equilibrium distribution, firms 
charging p0 must earn zero profits. Hence 
n(p0 ,D(p0)) - n(p0 - s,q) = sq + q[A(q) - A(D(p0 >>l . (A6) 
0 0 In order for a firm charging p not to prefer charging p - e 
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(strictly) it must be that 
Using (A6) the inequality in (A7) is equivalent to 
0 A(D(p ) - A(q) ~ e 
for e ) 0. Since e is arbitrary, and the possible number of mass 
CD 






0 * that e. ~ 0 and p - e. > p is not a mass point of G(p) for any i. 
1 1 
Thus, (AS) is equivalent to 
A(D(p0 )) ~ A(q) 
Since D(p0 ) < q < s, s minimizes average costs and A' < 0 on the 
lett-hand branch, 
A(s) ~ A(q) < A(D(p0)). 
which contradicts (A9). 
Q.E.D. 
0 * This argument fails only when p = p • 
Lemma 2: In any nondegenerate equilibrium, u -1 u a1
f(p ) =A (p ) and 
(A9) 
-1 * u u a1 f(p) ~A (p) for all p-[p ,p ], where p is the upper bound on the 
support of G(p). 
Proof: 0 -1 0 0 * u Suppose a
1
f(p) >A (p) for some p - [p ,p ]. Then any 
firm offering p0 will earn strictly positive profits since a
1
f(p0 ) is 
0 -1 0 equal to the expected demand of nonshoppers and a1 f(p ) > A (p ) 
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0 0 -1 implies A(a1 f(p )) < p • Hence it must be that a1f(p) ~A (p) for 
• u u 
all p- [p ,p ]. Since G(p) has no mass point at p, the highest 
price in the market, any firm charging p will sell only to 
u 
nonshoppers. Hence zero profits implies A(a1 f(pu)) = Pu· Q.E.D. 
Lemma 3: In any nondegenerate equilibrium, a 1 is defined by 
N -1 a1 = max{a1 I f(p)a1 ~ A (p) for all p} 
and pu is detined by 
N -1 
f(pu)a1 =A (pu), 
where A-l(p) is defined on the left hand branch of A(q). 
Proof: Immediate from Lemma 2. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 4: 0 if and only if a ~ 




is the minimum price in the market. 
....L n-1 , where p1 
Proof: If G(p1) = 0, then the firm which offers p1 sells to all who 
N N sample it. Hence D(p
1




), and consistency requires D(p1) ~ s; if D(p1) so 
derined is greater than s, it cannot be a profit maximizing 
price/quantity pair since it would be in the firm's interest to hold 
price constant but reduce output. Thus we need 
N N a (1 - a) + na a f(p 1) ~ s 







Sufficiency will be proved ror n = 2. The validity of the 
result for n 2 3 will be obvious. We argue by contradiction. Suppose 
_1_ 
n-1 • 
* and G(p ) ) 0. By the same logic as Lemma 1- p1 = p and 
D(p *> = aN + 2 N 1 a2 
* In this case we need D(p ) = s; i.e. 
* f(p ). 
N N * 1 * * {a1 + 2a2[(1- G(p ) + 2 G(p )]}f(p ) = s • 
* * But G(p) = G(p ). Thus we need 
N N * * [a
1 
+ a2(2- G(p ))]f(p ) = s 
[(1- a)aN + 2aaN- aaNG(p*)] = ~s~.-. 
f(p ) 






aG(p ) = ---=--- - 1 
aNf(p•) 
---=-s__ - J. 
aNf(p•) 
(AlO) 
Where n = 2, (A9) implies the right-hand side of (AlO) is greater than 
• or equal to 1. Hence G(p ) must be less than or equal to 0, which is 
a contradiction. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 5: Suppose G(p1) = 0. Then 
N N n-1 D(p) = [a1 + nan(1- G(p)) ] f(p) • 
Proof: N The expected number of nonshoppers who sample a firm is a1 • 
Of the shoppers, the expected number who sample a firm is naN since 
n 
each takes n observations. The probability ot a sale to one of these 
is just (1 n-1 G(p)) since shoppers buy from the lowest priced firm 
in their sample. Finally, each consumer demands f(p) units. 
Lemma 6: Suppose u(p1) = 0. Then 







where a1 and pn are given in Lemma 3, an 
a ) N <1_a a1 , p1 is given by 
P1 = min{plf(p)(na: +a~) = A-
1 (p)}, 
where A-1 (p) is defined on the left-hand-branch of A(q). 
Proof: The zero profit constraint requires that A(D(p)) = p for all 
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prices which are actually offered. Thus, from Lemma 5, 
A([a~ + na~(1- G(p))n-1]f(p)) = p 
N N 1 - A
-1(n) 
+ na (1 - G(p))n- - ---a1 n - f(p) 
n-1 A-1 Cp) N 
(1 - G(p)) = f(p) - a1 






In this calculation, A-1 Cp) is taken to be the left-hand-branch of 
A(q) since by Lemma 4, 
s 2 f(p) 
whenever G(p1) = 0. 
To find p1 , solve G(p1) = 0: 
A-1(pl) 
_1_ 




A (pl) N _1_ = - a1 f(pl) N na 
n 
N N -1 (na + a1)f(pl) = A (pl) . n 
Since this formula can have two solutions, we need to define p1 as the 
min1mum. The maximum solution can be ruled out since it can be shown 
to be greater than p • 
u 
To find p , solve G(p ) = 1: u u 




Note that this final calculation is consistent with Lemma 3. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 7: A necessary and sufficient condition for a single price 
* equilibrium at p is 
a 2. 1 _ f(A(s)) 
s 
* for all p 2. p 
Proof: Assume (All) holds but there exists a nondegenerate 
(All) 
equilibrium. First, we claim such a distribution must have a mass 
point. 
Fact 1: (All) implies a~f(p) ~ A-l(p) for all p 2. p* where A-l(p) is 
the left-hand-branch of A(q) and a~ = (1 - a)aC where ac is defined by 
acf(A(s)) = s (i.e. aC is the "competitive" consumer/firm ratio). 
Proof of fact: aCf(A(s)) = s implies f(A(s))/s = 1/ac. Hence (All) 
is equivalent to 
or, 
-1 
a 2. 1 - A (p) 
c a f(p) 
or, finally, 
c p ~ A(a (1- a)f(p)) 
* for all p 2. p 
* for all p 2. p 
* for all p 2. p 
Now ac(l - a) = a~, so (A12) establishes the desired fact. 
(A12) 
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Fact 2: c nac)f(p) (al + n 
> acf(p) for all p such that f(p) > o. 
Proof of fact: Since f(p) > 0 by assumption, it suffices to show 
c c 
a1 + nan 
c 
> a • 
c c But a1 + nan = 
(1 c - a)a + naa c = a c + a(n - c 1) a • 
Since n 2 2 by assumption, Fact 2 must hold. 
Fact 2 implies that (a~+ na~)f(p) intersects A(q) to the 
c c -1 right of s; i.e. while (a
1 
+ nan)f(p) =A (p) can be solved for two 
prices, the min1mum of these must satisfy (a~ + na~)f(p) > s in this 
case. 
N Now we are assuming a nondegenerate equilibrium exists, so a
1 
satisfies by f(p )aN
1 
= A-l(p ) where A-l(p) is the left-hand-branch of 
u u 
A(q). Fact 1 implies a~> a~; i.e. a1 must increase in order for 
-1 N N C C a1f(p) to be tangent with A (p). Hence a1 +nan> a1 +nan, and 
N N C C (a
1 
+ nan)f(p) > <a
1 
+ nan)f(p) for all p such that f(p) > 0. Thus, 
since A-l(p) is increasing on the right-hand-branch, (a~+ na~)f(p) 
-1 intersects A (p) at a point even further to the right of s than 
(a~+ na~)f(p) does. But U(p) must then have a mass point because 
this result violates the _necessary and sufficient condition for no 
mass point given in Lemma 4 (see also the proof of that Lemma) • 
• So assume (All) holds but we have a mass point at p
1 
= p • 
Proceeding as in Lemma 1 with n = 2 we have 
• Again, zero profits requires D(p
1
) = s since p1 = p , i.e. 
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Thus, solving for G(pl) gives 
= 2-
1-a s - 1 G(pl) 
0' N a (l-a)f(p
1
) 
• But using f(p
1
) = f(p) = f(A(s)), (All) can be written 
f(A(s)) A-l(p) 
a L 1 - s f(p) 
Consider p = pu. Then we have 
A-1( ) 
a L f(A(s)) pu 
s f(p ) 
u 
or, atter some manipulations, 
sf(p ) 
u - 1 
f(p )A-l(p ) 
u 




N N But by definition a (1- a)f(pu) = a1f(pu) A-l(p ). Hence (Al3) u 
implies 
Applying (A14) we have G(p1) L 2 - 1 = 1 so any potential mass point 
• must have G(p1) = G(p ) = 1. Thus (All) is sufficient for a 
competitive outcome. 
Necessity of (All) follows in reverse order of the proof of 
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Fact 1 above, noting that profit maximization requires that no firm 
• earn positive profits by deviating from p when all other firms charge 
• c • 
p , i.e. p ~ A(a1f(p)) for all p 2 p • Q.E.D. 
The Theorem follows directly from these lemmas. 
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LOST PROFITS, MARKET DAMAGES, AND SPECIFIC PERFORMAN~E: 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF BUYER'S BREACH 
I. INTRODUC!'ION 
A contracL is an agreement to exchange, at a later date, a 
specified amount of goods or services for an agreed upon sum of money. 
The important characteristic of contracts that distinguishes them from 
general exchanges is the difference between the time the agreement was 
made and the time of performance. This difference in timing can often 
lead to changes in circumstances which can cause one of the parties to 
withdraw from the contract. Ideally, a contract would contain clauses 
for every possible contingency that could occur between the time of 
the agreement and the time of performance. However, such a contract 
is impossible since all the possible contingencies may not be known to 
the two parties. Furthermore it may be difficult to monitor states of 
the world which are known to only one party. Finally, even if the 
previous two problems could be overcome, the costs of negotiating each 
clause would be too enormous to make the contract worth while. As a 
result, contrac~s are always incomplete and it is frequently the case 
that one of the parties no longer wishes to fulfill the contract. 
This breaking of the contract is known as breach. The case that is 
considered in this work is buyer's breach of contracts for goods. 
A large part of economic transactions is in the form of 
contracts. In fact contracts are frequently necessary for 
economically efficient exchanges to occur. For example a buyer and a 
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seller may be willing to exchange. but suppose the buyer does not have 
ready cash for the transaction. Suppose all other buyers were willing 
to pay less for the goods. then it would be economically efficient for 
the seller to enter into a contract with the first buyer and complete 
the transaction at a later time. However. it neither of them could 
rely on the other to fulfill the contract. they would rather engage in 
less-efficient noncontractual exchanges with other parties. Thus 
there is a need for legal protection for breach of contract. 
It is understood in the legal system that states of the world 
may arise when it is actually not efficient for a contract to be 
completed. Consequently. the objective is not to punish the breaching 
party. but to leave the innocent party unaffected by the breach. This 
principle is known as the protection of the expectation interest of 
the innocent party. The principle holds that the court should leave 
the innocent party as well off as he or she would have been had the 
contract been completed. 
Any action taken by the court to compensate the innocent party 
in case of breach is known as a remedy. The most commonly used remedy 
for buyer's breach is market damages. This requires the buyer to pay 
the seller the difference between the contract price and the price at 
which the seller would be able to resell, for every unit breached. If 
the difference is negative. nothing is paid. The reselling price is 
normally taken to be the current market price and consequently. a 
market for spot sales is necessary to implement this remedy. Another 
remedy which does not have this requirement is specific performance. 
30 
Here the courts enforce performance as specified in the contract ana 
the buyer is effectively not allowed to breach. The advantage of this 
remedy is that by definition, it protects the seller's expectation 
interest exactly. However, specific performance is thought to be 
economically inefficient, since the buyer is made to accept unwanted 
goods which he would then attempt to resell. It would be more 
etficient for the original seller to do the reselling, since he is in 
the business of selling and would have lower selling costs than the 
contract buyer. Because of this drawback, specific performance has 
limited use in practice. 
Until recently, the predominant legal practice was to use 
market damages and only in the rare cases when market damages could 
not be implemented was specific performance used. Even in the absence 
ot a clear spot market price, if the seller was able to resell and the 
court was satisfied that a conscientious effort had been made to 
obtain the highest price, the reselling price was used in the market 
damages formula. However, it has been argued that market damages 
insufficiently compensates the seller especially in the case that the 
spot price is greater than the contract price. The reasoning is as 
follows: if a buyer repudiates a contract and the seller is able to 
resell the breached goods to a third party, the seller has still lost 
the profit that would have been made on the breach contract, because 
he or she would have sold to the third party whether or not the breach 
occurred. Compensation based on this argument is called lost profits, 
and requires the buyer to pay to the seller the extra profit that 
31 
would be earned if the additional units specified in the contract are 
produced and sold at the contract price. In the case of constant 
marginal costs it is simply the contract price less the marginal cost 
for every unit breached. In practice, this remedy is used when it is 
clear that the third party would have purchased had there been no 
breach, and the seller has enough capacity to supply both parties. 
Th1s paper compares the various remedies in their 
effectiveness in protecting the seller's expectation interest under 
the assumption that there is no reliance; that is, the seller does not 
take any actions due to the existence of the contract before the 
breach. It is shown that under very general conditions lost profits 
overcompensates the seller, and the size of the error is greater the 
more market power the seller has, and the smaller the difference 
between the buyer's reselling costs and the seller's selling costs. 
Similarly, under the condition that the contract price is greater than 
the spot market price, market damages undercompensates the seller and 
the size of the error is greater the larger the buyer's extra 
reselling costs. However, when the condition is not met, it is 
ambiguous whether market damages protects expectation interest 
adequately since it offers the seller an advantage in the resale 
market and a disadvantage in the contract market which may not always 
offset each other. 
Another important area of comparison is economic efficiency. 
Unfortunately a complete analysis of the efficiency properties of the 
three remedies would require a model with an endogenous contract 
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market. Th1s has proven to be mathematically intractible. Thus only 
an informal discussion of economic efficiency is possible. It is 
argued that specific performance tends to be inefficient whenever the 
contract buyer incurs extra reselling costs when selling in the spot 
market. Lost profits tends to be inefficient whenever a thick resale 
market exists. However a comparison between the economic efficiencies 
of the three remedies is not possible. 
Finally, if we look at the costs of implementing the three 
remedies, it is clear that specific performance and market damages are 
straightforward to administer but for lost profits, we require 
accurate information about the shape of the seller's cost function 
which will be costly to acquire. 
Section II of this paper presents a simple model of buyer's 
breach, and demonstrates that lost profits overcompensates the seller 
and market damages usually undercompensates. Section III relates the 
results of this paper to the existing literature on lost profits 
remedies, primarily the state-of-the-art legal analysis due to Goetz 
and ~cott [1979]. Section IV contains a discussion of the economic 
efficiency ot the remedies and is followed by the conclusion in 
Section V. 
II. THE MODEL 
There are two types of agents in the model: buyers and 
sellers. They act in a two-period static model in which the two 
periods are separated by the realization of random variables that 
influence the buyers' demands. In period one there is a contract 
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market and in period two there is a spot market. The sellers sell in 
both markets and it is assumed that they take no actions due to the 
existence of their contract obligations until after the random 
variables are realized. This means, in legal terms, that there is no 
reliance on the sellers' part. The sellers' objective is to maximize 
their expected profits in the two markets. 
The buyers' objective is to maximize their expected utility 
over the two markets. They buy in the contract market or the spot 
market depending on their preferences. They realize that if they buy 
in the contract market in period two they will be allowed to resell 
any amounts they wish in the spot market under a certain market 
structure that is known to both buyers and sellers. Also, they may 
breach in period two and incur damages corresponding to the amount 
breached according to a damage rule that is known to both buyers and 
sellers. In this model we take the contracts (price and quantities) 
as given and examine the spot market. 
The central issue in the lost profits argument is whether a 
sale that is made after the breach occurs replaces the contract that 
was breached. If the buyer, after breaching the contract, waited for 
a better price and then bought the same product, profits would not be 
lost; they would simply be realized at a different time, and possibly 
by a different seller. So it is important in a lost profits claim 
that the buyer who is breaching really does not want the goods. 
To incorporate this idea in the model, it is assumed that 
there are several buyers (who buy in the contract market) with 
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stochastic demands that are governed by n independent random 
variables. The buyers make their contracts before the random 
variables are realized. Afterwards, some buyers may not want all the 
goods for which they had contracted, because the realizations of their 
random variables yielded low states of demand. These buyers must 
decide how to allocate their contracted goods between consumption, 
resale, and breach. For simplicity we will assume one contract buyer. 
We denote the buyer's inverse demand curve, a downward sloping 
function, by t(Q). (Because all the choice variables are quantities, 
it is most convenient to use inverse demand curves.) Since the 
contract buyer is not in the business of selling, we assume an extra 
reselling cost per unit, denoted by r, and it is assumed that r 2 0. 
We let Q be the amount consumed, Q be the amount resold, and 0_ be 
c s ~ 
the amount breacned by the buyer, if he has contracted for more than 
he desires. Alternatively, for high realizations of demand, the buyer 
may have contracted for less than he or she desires and will purchase 
in the spot market; this quantity is denoted by Q • Finally, let Z be p 
the amount contracted by the buyer at the contract price K. Clearly, 
the amounts consumed, resold and breacned should sum to the total 
amount contracted plus the amount purchased in the spot market. 
Consider for the moment a single seller, with constant 
marginal costs C, who sells in two markets: a contract market in which 
an in1tial agreement is made for delivery at a later date, and a spot 
market. For example, a new car dealer will often sell cars of custom 
specification which are special-ordered from the factory, but will 
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also sell display models on the spot market. Similarly, faced with 
uncertain demand, a risk averse buyer may prefer to pay a premium and 
purchase in the contract market, whereas if the buyer is less risk 
averse, he or she will wait until the demand is revealed and buy on 
the spot market. An example is whether to contract for farm labor 
before the harvest or wait and hire after the size of the crop is 
b~n. 
The demands in the spot and contract markets will of course be 
interrelated, since the products in the two markets are slightly 
differentiated versions of the same commodity, either through their 
physical properties or by the fact that they are sold at different 
times. The precise nature of this relationship is unimportant in the 
analysis of sellers' remedies. We shall simply assume that the 
realization of the expected inverse demand in the spot market of the 
buyers wno do not buy in the contract market, P{Q), is downward 
sloping without specifying its relation to the demands of the buyers 
in the contract market or the contract price. To guarantee that both 
contract and spot markets exist, we assume that t{O) > C and P{O) > C. 
In order to complete the model we must describe how the 
original seller interacts with the buyers from the contract market who 
wish to resell in the spot market. There is a continuum of 
possibilities starting with the resellers being complete price takers, 
and ending with them being equals with the original seller in a 
Cournot oligopoly. The results hold for most market structures but we 
shall restrict our attention to the "competitive" case and the 
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Stackelberg case for the purposes of the paper. The "competitive" 
assumption is examined in Part A and the Stackelberg in Part B. In 
each case we will calculate the seller's profits under the three 
remedies of interest: lost profits, market damages, and specific 
performance. The final step is to compare the profits under specific 
performance at the time of breach, which is our benchmark, with the 
profits under the other two remedies, to determine how well each 
remedy protects the seller's expectation. 
The problem is solved in the following fashion. We begin, 
after the random variables have been revealed, with the decision of 
the contract buyers of how to allocate their contract into the three 
ac~ivities of consumption, resale and breach. Then we combine the 
resale quantity decisions of the contract buyers with the selling 
quantity decision of the original seller to determine the outcome of 
the spot market. From this we can calculate the profits of each agent 
in the spot market. 
A. "Competitive" Assumption 
Let us assume that the contract buyers are price takers in the 
resale market. If lost profits is the legal remedy for breach, then 
the gain to the buyer (surplus plus profit), denoted by n, will be 
where T(Q) is the surplus associated with the demand t(Q) and P is the 
price in the spot market. The first term is the surplus from 
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consuming Qc and the second is the profits from selling Qs units in 
the spot market. From that we subtract the cost of purchasing Qc + Qs 
units at the contrac~ price K and Q units at the spot market price P; 
p 
and the lost profits paid to the seller for the ~ units breached, at 
the rate of K - C per unit. In order to determine the optimal 
allocation of the total contract and spot purchases between 
consumption, resale, and breach, the buyer will maximize profit plus 
surplus (1) subject to the three uses not exceeding the total contract 




The general solution to the above problem is given in the appendix. 
It turns out that the buyer will breach when firstly breaching is 
(2) 
(3) 
preferred to selling (C > P - r) and secondly the state of demand is 
low enough (t(Z) <C). The amount breached is Z- t-1 (C) and the 
amount consumed 1s t-1 (C), with no units resold and no units 
purchased. Thus the profit to the original seller under lost profits 
when the buyer breacnes is 
nl = max[P(Q) - C]Q + [K- C]t-l(C) + [K- C](Z- t-l(C)) 
Q 




where Q is the amount supplied by the original seller in the spot 
market. The first term represents the profit to the seller from the 
spot market, the second the profit from actual sales in the contract 
market and lastly the lost profits on the units breached. 
Now we wish to compare the seller's profit under lost profits 
(4) with the profit made under specific performance, under the same 
state of demand. Again we begin with the buyer's behavior, how much 
he consumes, resells, under the same state of demand as before but now 
specific performance is the legal remedy for breach so the buyer is 
effectively not allowed to breach. The buyer's objective function is 
very s1milar to the previous formulation (1), except for the term 
which allows breach. 
n = T(Q ) + Q (P - r) - K(Q + Q ) 




The buyer maximizes (5) subject to the following constraints which are 
similar to the previous ones. 
Q +Q =Z+Q. 
c s p 
( 6) 
(7) 
We show in the appendix that when the buyer would have breached under 
lost profits (t(Z) < C and P- r <C), one of two cases occur. If 
t(Z) < P - r then the buyer will consume t-1 (P - r) units and resell 
Z - t-1 (P - r) units, otherwise he or she will simply consume the 
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entire contrac~. It is important to notice that the amount resold 
under specific performance L - t-1 (P - r) is always less than 
-1 Z- t (C), the amount breached under lost profits. 
max 
Q 
In this case, the profit to the original seller is 
{
[P(X) - C]Q + [K - C]Z 
[P(Q) - C]Q + LK - C]Z 
t(Z) < P(X) - r 
P(X) - r ~ t(Z) < C ( 8) 
where X is the combined supply of the original seller and the contract 
buyer in the spot market, X= Q + Z- t-1 (P(X)- r). 
If we compare the seller's profits under the two remedies, we 
see that when t(Z) < P(X) - r the two expressions are identical, so 
that lost profits compensates exactly. However, when t(Z) 2 P(X) .- r, 
we show in the appendix that n1 - ns ) 0 and lost profits 
overcompensates the seller. The intuition for the latter assertion 
can be understood using ~he following diagrams. 
Let us assume that the state of demand is such that the buyer 
would breach under lost profits an amount B, and under specific 
performance he or she would resell some amount less than B depending 
upon how large r is. Let D be the demand of the other buyers in the 
spot market. In Figure 1 we see that the total profit to the original 
seller under lost profits is the sum of the three shaded areas; the 
profit in the contract market, the lost profits and the profit in the 
spot market (determined by setting marginal revenue equal to marginal 
cost). Since production decisions are delayed until after the random 
variables are revealed, only the amounts supplied in the contract and 
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spot markets are produced and the B units breached are not produced. 
In ¥igure 2, we assume the same state of demand occurred, but now 
specific performance is the legal remedy for breach. With the same 
demand conditions, under specific performance the optimal amount the 
contrac~ buyer chooses to resell is an amount between zero and B, 
depending upon his extra reselling cost. Since the buyer can sell as 
much as he or she wishes at the going spot price, it is optimal for 
the seller to choose the spot price so as to maximize the profit from 
the residual demand (after the contract buyer has resold) which we 
denote by D'. Clearly the profit to the seller under lost profits is 
greater than or equal to the profit under specific performance, since 
D' ~D. It is equal when the buyer resells nothing. The buyer's 
reselling decision is directly dependent upon the size of the extra 
reselling costs. The greater the costs, the more is resold. Thus lost 
profits compensate exactly whenever the extra reselling costs are 
prohibitively high so that the contract buyer does not resell anything 
under specific performance. Otherwise lost profits tends to 
overcompensate the seller. 
We analyze the effectiveness of market damages in protecting 
the seller's expectation interest in a similar fashion. It turns out 
that market damages undercompensates the seller. The proof is in the 
appendix. We can show the intuition of the results through the use of 
some diagrams. 
We will let B be the amount the buyer would breach under 
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market. Then the sum of the three shaded areas in Figure 3 is the 
profit to the seller. Since the seller gets K - P for each unit 
breacned, it is optimal for him or her to choose a price in the spot 
market which maximizes the profit on the remaining units (after the 
first B units). 
In Figure 4, the same state of demand has occurred as in the 
previous figure, but the legal remedy for breach is specific 
performance. Since breacn is not allowed, the profit in the contract 
market is (K - C)Z. The demand by the other buyers in the spot market 
will be the same as before; however, the contract buyer will engage in 
some reselling for prices above t(z) + r. Thus the residual demand 
facing the original seller is D'. We see that the profit to the 
seller, which is the total shaded area, is greater in this case than 
in the case of market damages. Thus market damages tends to 
undercompensate the seller. 
B. Noncompetitive Assumption 
The reasoning of the competitive case carries over to the case 
ot the noncompetitive spot markets. However, there is an important 
difference in the noncompetitive situation for the case of a seller 
with market power. For both the money damage remedies, the buyer will 
engage in less reselling since there are more activities in which to 
allocate the contract. This will result in less loss of market power 
in the spot market for the original seller, than under specific 
performance. Thus the two money damage remedies will have an 
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competitive case. For lost profits, since both effects are in the 
same direction, the outcome is that lost profits will continue to 
overcompensate. However, for market damages the two effects are in 
opposite directions and the combined effect could be either way 
depending upon which noncompetitive assumption is made. In the case 
of a Stackelberg assumption, the basic effect dominates the market 
power effect, so that the net result is that market damages 
undercompensates (for P < K). 
In selecting a noncompetitive assumption the main idea we wish 
to preserve from the previous section is that the original seller 
dominates the spot market. The most natural assumption to make is 
that the original seller is a leader and the resellers are followers 
in a Stackelberg market structure. The resellers react to the 
quantity supplied by the original seller in a predictable way, and the 
original seller chooses the quantity to supply in each market by 
optimiz1ng against the resellers' reaction functions. This 
formulation takes into account the weaker position of the resellers 
with respect to the original seller. In what follows we determine the 
original seller's profit with the Stackelberg assumption under each 
remedy. Finally we compare the profit under each money damage remedy 
with that under specific performance. 
1. Lost Profits 
In order to determine the seller's profit, we first need to 
know how the buyers will behave under the lost profits remedy for 
breach. We start as before with the buyer's objective function n. 
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Optimizing behavior on the buyer's part will yield a reaction curve 
describing how much the buyer will supply to the spot market for each 
quantity the original seller supplies. The original seller will then 
aggregate all the individual contract buyer's reaction curves into a 
grand reaction curve, which tells the seller for each quantity it 
supplies the total amount the others will supply. The quantity the 
seller chooses to supply in the spot market will maximize its profits 
given that the buyers behave according to the grana reaction curve. 
For simplicity ot presentation, we will again assume that 
there is one contract buyer. As before, the buyer's problem is to 
maximize 
n = T(Q ) + P(Q + Q ) • Q + (Z - Qc - Qs)C - KZ, c s s (9) 
where P(•) is the inverse demand curve in the spot market and Q is the 
amount supplied by the original seller. In this case we assume no 
resale costs as they are not essential for the existence of buyer's 
breach and would serve to complicate the expressions. The 
maximization is subject to the constraint that the amounts consumed 
and resold should not exceed the total contracted amount, 
Q + Q + a_ ~ Z and the nonnegativity constraints Q L 0, a_ L 0. 
c s lb c lb 
Since resale costs have been eliminated, Q refers to both sales and 
s 
purchases in the spot market; more specifically, negative values of Q s 
indicate purchases in the spot market. 
The only other term that is different in this objective 
function from the one previously formulated for the competitive case 
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(1) is the second term. The reason for the difference is that the 
noncompetitive case allows the quantity supplied by the reseller to 
atfect the price in the spot market. 
It is useful to define some terms which will simplify the 
notation. Consider the spot market inverse demand curve. If an agent 
with marginal cost 9 was one of several sellers in the spot market, 
then the agent's objective function would be 
P(w + Q) • w - 9w, (10) 
where w is the amount the agent supplies and 0 the total amount all 
the other sellers supply. The first order condition for maximizing 
(10) is 
Solving for w as a function of n from (13) will give the reaction 
function of the agent, which we will denote by R(•) as tallows: 
w = R(0;9). 
(11) 
(12) 
Thus R(0;9) is the general reaction curve for the inverse demand 
function p(•), which describes how much an agent with marginal costs 9 
will supply given that the others are supplying ll. 
Using this notation, the complete solution to the optimization 
ot the buyer's objective function (11) is 
49 
[t-1 (C),R(Q;C),Z- Q - Q] 
c s 
[Z- Q ,R(Q;t(Z- Q )),0] 
s s 
Q > D} t (Z) > P 
Q~D 
t(Z) ! P 
(13) 
where Q ~ D is the condition equivalent to t-1 (C) + R(Q;C) l Z when we 
isolate Q. The meaning of the latter condition is that if he or she 
were unconstrained the amount consumed and resold would exceed z. 
Equivalently, given that consumption and reselling are constrained by 
Z, the condition implies that nothing will be breached. Or in terms 
ot D, Q ~ D implies the buyer will not breach, because the original 
seller is supplying so little to the spot market that it is 
advantageous to resell whatever is not consumed. The amount the buyer 
supplies in the spot market is indicated by the middle term in each 
case. The first branch of the buyer's resale decision is simply a 
normal reaction curve with marginal costs C, and the second branch is 
the reaction that would occur if consumption plus resale were always 
constrained to z. Equation 13 is derived 1n the appendix. We can 
show the reselling decision in a diagram (Figure 5). 
The original seller optimizes against the contract buyer's 
lost profits reaction curve. Let us denote the two part reaction 
curve illustrated in figure 1 by 1R{ (Q). The original seller's 
profits are 
so 
max K(Q + Q ) + (K- C)(Z- Q - Q) 
Q c s s c 
+ p ( Q + 1R l ( Q) ) • Q - c ( Q + Q + Q ) • 
c s 
(14) 
If we separate the components, the sellers' profits are the revenues 
from contract sales plus lost profits collected from the breach minus 
the cost of producing the contract sales. The remaining terms reflect 
what happens in the spot market. The seller supplies Q and the price 
is determined by the combined supply of the original seller and the 
c·ontrac"t buyer. The quantity remaining to be produced is Q and we 
subtract the cost of producing it. Simplifying (14), 
max (K - C) Z + P( Q + 1R l ( Q)) • Q - CQ 
Q 
max (K- C)Z + [P(Q + E l (Q)) - C]Q 
Q 
( K - C) z + [ p ( Q{ + 1R l ( Q{)) - C] Q{, 
where Ql refers to the optimal choice of Q for the seller. 
2. Market Damages 
When market damages is the legal remedy for breach, the 
buyer's profits are as follows: 
7t = 
{
T(Q) + Q P(Q + Q) - K(Q + Q) - [K- P(.)]O_ 
c s s c s o 
T(Q ) + Q P(Q + Q ) - K(Q + Q ) c s s c s 
p < K 
P 2 K 
There are two cases. Nothing is paid if the spot price is greater 
than the contract price. Otherwise, the difference between the 






* Qc is the monopoly output for marginal costs C. 
QC is the competitive output for marginal costs C. 
Q is the amount the original seller needs to supply to prevent 
a contract buyer, who cannot breach, from entering. 
D is the critical level of the original seller's supply which 
determines whether the contract buyer will breach or not 
under lost profits. 
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The solution to the buyer's problem 
-1 
[ t (P)·O·Z- Q 1 
' ' c 
p < K 
[t-1 (K),R(Q;K),Z- Q - Q 1· Q > :} 
t(Z) < P 
c s ' 
P 2 K 
[Z- Q ,R(Q;t(Z- Q ));01; 
s s 
t(Z) 2 P 
(17) 
where Q 2 E is analogous to the condition Q 2 D in the lost profits 
calculation. 
Us1ng (17) we can again compute the profit of the original 
seller when the buyer breaches. For P < K, the profit is 
max K • Q 
c Q 
+ [K- P(Q)1[Z- Q 1 + P(Q)Q- C[Q + Q 1. 
c c 
( 18) 
The first two terms in (18) consist of the revenue earned from selling 
Q in the contract market and the market damages collected on the 
c 
units breached. The remaining terms are the revenue from the spot 
market minus the entire cost of production. 
For Y 2 K, the contract buyer is reselling according to the 
two part reac~ion curve defined in (19). Let us denote the reaction 
curve by 1Rm(Q). The original seller will optimize against the 
reac~ion curve. Thus, the seller's profit is 
max 
Q 
K ( Q + Q ) + P ( Q + :R m ( Q) ) Q - C [ Q + ( Q + Q ) 1 • 
c s c s 
( 19) 
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Combining (18) and (19), and simplifying further, we find that 
the seller's profits under market damages are 
nm = max {[P(Q) - C] [Q + Qc] + [K - P(Q)] Z 
Q [P(Q + 1Rm(Q)) - C]Q + [K- C][1Rm(Q) 
3. Specific Performance 
+ y ] 
c 
P(•) L K. 
(20) 
When the remedy for breach is specific performance, buyers are 
effectively never allowed to breach. Once a contract is made they can 
only choose between consumption and resale. Thus buyer's objective 
function is 
n = T(Q ) + P(Q + Q ) • Q - KZ, 
c s s 
(21) 
and the problem is to maximize (21) subject to Q + Q = z. The 
c s 
solution is 
[Q ,Q] = [Z- Q ,R(Q;t(Z- Q ))]. c s s s (22) 
The buyer's behavior in equation (22) is exactly the same as lost 
profits when Q < D, and market damages when Q < E. 
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Figure 6 illustrates the reaction curve for the case when 
there is only one contract buyer. If there were more than one 
contrac~ buyer in each case, the seller would aggregate the reaction 
curves of all the resellers, resulting in a grand reaction curve which 
tells how much the others will supply in total for each quantity 
supplied by the original seller. However, that is an unnecessary 
complication for the present purposes. Denoting R(Q;t(Z- Q )) by 
s 
Es(Q), the profits to the seller will be 
ns = max (K - C)Z + [P(Q + 1R s(Q)) - C]Q 
Q 
= (K - C)Z + LP(Qs + 1R s(Qs)) - C]Qs. 
4. Comparison of the Remedies 
In order to determine how well each remedy protects the 
( 23) 
expectation interest of the innocent party, we compare the profits the 
innocent party gets in case of breach under each remedy with those it 
gets under specific performance, our benchmark. We recall the 
seller's profits under lost profits, market damages, and specific 
performance. 
(24) 
. p < K 





* Qc is the monopoly output for marginal costs C. 
ac is the competitive output for marginal costs c. 
Q is the amount the original seller needs to supply to prevent 
a contract buyer, who cannot breach, from entering. 
D is the critical level of the original seller's supply which 
determines whether the contract buyer will breach or not 
under lost profits. 
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Let us begin with lost profits. 
nl- ns = [P(Ql + 1R{ (Q{)) - C]Ql 
_ [P(Qs + 1R s(Qs)) _ C]Qs. 
(26) 
(27) 
From (27) it is apparent that the sign of the differences 
rests fully on the activity in the spot market. Since for the 
contrac~ buyer~ the amount resold under specific performance is less 
than or equal to that supplied under lost profits~ we have that 
m1(Q) ~ 1Rs(Q) for all Q. An intuitive explanation of this 
phenomenon is that under lost profits~ the contract buyer can dispose 
of unwanted goods in two ways~ reselling and breaching. Whereas under 
specific performance~ there is only one avenue of disposal_ to dump 
unwanted goods in the spot market. Thus more (or an equal amount) is 
resold on the spot market under specific performance than under lost 
profits. Since more is supplied~ the original seller will have to 
share more of the market with the resellers. Consequently~ the 
original seller earns at least as much profit under lost profits as 
under specific performance. But since we make the comparison when a 
buyer actually breaches under lost profits~ the difference in (24) is 
ac~ually strictly positive. The situation when a buyer actually 
breaches restricts our attention to the region where Q > D1 that is 
when the lost profits reaction curve is strictly beneath the specific 
performance reaction curve. Figure 7 will clarify our claims. 
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As we can see from the diagram, the lost profits reaction 
curve is identical with the reaction curve for specific performance, 
below D. Above D, it bends downwards. • At (O,QC) the original seller 
gets the most profits and as we move outward in any direction profits 
decrease. Thus if the tangency occurs above u, the isoprofit curve 
tangent to the lost profits reaction curve will be at a higher profit 
level than that which is tangent to the specific performance reaction 
curve. From this we see that nl is strictly greater than ns, and so 
lost profits strictly overcompensates. 
Next we shall compare market damages with specific 
performance. Since we are concerned only about what happens in case 
of breach, we need to deal with only the cases when P < K, and when 
P 2 K and Q > E. 
For P < K, an argument similar to that used in the competitive 
case can be used to show that the market damages remedy 
undercompensates the seller. The proof is in the appendix. However, 
for K ~ P we show that it is ambiguous whether the market damages 
remedy protects the seller's expectation interest. 
C. EXTENSIONS 
In the last sections, we concluded that the lost profits 
remedy is overcompensatory and the market damages remedy usually 
undercompensates under the assumptions of our simple model. These 
results are robust to relaxing certain of these assumptions. 
In particular, the conclusions of the simple model are true 





r original seller 
Q 
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~ Specifi: performance 








Breach occurs for 
Q in this region 
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general convex total cost curves, the results remain unchanged. 
Moreover, if we add more sellers to the problem, all of which behave 
in a Cournot fashion with respect to one another (in the Stackelberg 
case they all behave as leaders with respect to the contract buyers 
who are selling in the spot market), the generalization does not 
a:tfect the conclusions. Furthermore, as we add more sellers, the 
overcompensation under lost profits decreases as does the 
undercompensation under market damages (for P < K). If we retain the 
assumption of constant marginal costs, and allow the number of sellers 
to increase, the profit to any seller under each of the three remedies 
converges to the same amount. Otherwise with non-constant marginal 
costs, even in the limit, the profit to a seller under the market 
damages remedy (for P < K) is less than that under specific 
performance, which is less than that under the lost profits remedy. 
The profits under market damages for P 2 K, remain ambiguous when we 
add more and more sellers. Finally, connection between the size of 
the resale costs and the overcompensatory and undercompensatory 
natures of the lost profits and market damages remedies respectively 
is retained in the Stackelberg case. 
III. RELATED LlTERATIJRE 
The state of the art literature on buyer's breach is due to 
Goetz and Scott. The general conclusions of these authors are in 
agreement with those of this work. In fact, they develop a good 
intuitive explanation ot why these conclusions hold. 2 However, their 
formal analysis relies mainly on diagrams and does not quite capture 
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the complete argument. Furthermore, the "story'' behind the diagrams 
is never made very explicit. In fact, it is implicitly assumed that 
when one compares the profits of the seller under lost profits with 
those under specific performance, profits in the contract market are 
the same and thus can be ignored, so that only the profits in the spot 
market matter. This is only true when one correctly interprets the 
lost profits measure when marginal costs are not constant, since lost 
profits are always calculated assuming that the last units that would 
have been produced are breached. Unfortunately, most of their work 
for the case of the seller with market power deals with increasing 
marginal costs. 
Goetz and Scott consider two cases: sellers with market power 
and competitive sellers. This is a separation into possibilities on 
the supply side. However, in the competitive case they also assume 
that total market demand is competitive. This is evidenced by their 
claim that every seller can replace breached contracts by selling more 
in the spot market at the same price. Thus their analysis tor the 
competitive case has limited applicability since total market demand 
curves are rarely flat. 
Finally, in the Goetz and Scott model, buyers who wish to 
resell always enter the spot market competitively. We draw this 
conclusion by noting that whenever a buyer breaches, the spot market 
demand curve in their diagrams shifts outward by the amount the buyers 
would have resold. This indicates that the buyers are able to sell as 
much as they wish at the going spot market price. We have examined 
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this case in Section II and realized that under these circumstances, 
buyers will never breach unless they face a cost disadvantage in the 
spot market. But this aspect is never explicitly introduced in their 
mode~. Tnis certainly is a weakness of their model since the 
reselling cost is necessary in their model for buyers to ever breach. 
Furthermore, Goetz and Scott give examples where buyers would have 
resold virtually all of the breached amount if breach were not 
allowed, since they had equal access to the resale market. Thus there 
is a need for a model that does not rely on resale costs as an 
explanation of breach. 
In summary, Goetz and Scott have a very good intuition of why 
lost profits are overcompensatory. However, their analysis does not 
support their claim. 
IV. OTHER CRITERIA FOR COMPARISON 
From the models in the previous sections we have concluded 
that the lost profits remedy overcompensates the seller and the market 
damages remedy usually undercompensates. However, there are other 
criteria for comparing the remedies. 
One important consideration is the economic efficiency of the 
remedies. A complete analysis of economic efficiency requires a model 
of the two period sequence of contract ana spot markets. Then the 
total expected surplus under each remedy can be compared. However 
this has proven to be intractable. 
The important aspect for efficiency is that all buyers should 
purchase until their marginal utility equals the marginal production 
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cost from either market, and reselling by buyers should be eliminated 
since it is inefficient due to the extra reselling costs. Thus in the 
spot market the price should be marginal cost since that is the last 
period of the model and so all buyers will be using the 
straightforward strategy of purchasing until their marginal utility 
equals price. The contract price can be higher than marginal cost 
reflecting the added gain to the buyer of being able to resell next 
period and the loss to the original seller from entry by the contract 
buyers into the spot market price. But if the spot market price was 
always going to be marginal cost, no one would make contracts for 
prices greater than the spot price. Thus, there would be no need for 
the contract market if the spot market were operating efficiently. 
However, this follows when the only reason for the existence 
of the contract market is due to uncertainty ot the spot market price, 
as it is in the formal model. Contrac~s can also occur because of 
convenience. For example in the case of new car sales the normal 
method of exchange is through a contract, whereby the buyer need not 
carry cash during the search process, and he or she can have some time 
in which to back out and only incur the damages. Thus the contract 
market would not vanish in many realistic cases. Now, for ex ante 
economy efficiency we need that the expected number of resales by 
contract buyers be zero. For ex poste efficiency we need that the 
inefficiency due to the actual number of resales to be compensated by 
the gain in efficiency due to the convenience of contracts. 
Unfortunately, even with many s1mplyfing assumptions, the 
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mathematical analysis of the two period model is too difficult to 
permit computation of the spot and contract prices under each remedy. 
As a result only a discussion of informal observations of the 
efficiency properties of the remedies is possible. For a fixea 
contract, specific performance has the disadvantage that more resales 
occur than under the other two remedies, which results in more 
inefficiency whenever the reselling costs to the contract buyer are 
greater than that to the seller. However the effect becomes ambiguous 
when we notice that less contracts will occur and less will be 
contrac~ed for under specific performance than under the other two 
remedies, simply because there are fewer options available under 
specific performance. 
Similarly, lost profits is inefficient in two ways. First, 
the overcompensation is greater the fewer sellers there are in the 
market, that is, the more market power the seller has. When there is 
market power, output is restricted, which is inefficient. The 
inefficiency is compounded. by lost profits, which provides greater 
overcompensation for sellers that are more inefficient. Second, we 
need to consider the incentives of a seller, with or without market 
power, under the lost profits remedy. Since the lost profits remedy 
reimburses the seller for the profits that would have been earned on 
the breached contract, the seller can behave as if total sales were 
the sum of actual sales plus those that were breached. This illusion 
allows the existence of more sellers than is warranted by the demand. 
Thus, lost profits is inefficient. 
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The efficiency properties of the market damages remedy are not 
clear without endogeniz1ng ~he contract market. Thus, with the 
present analysis, some efficiency properties can be discussed, but a 
comparison of the overall efficiency ot each remedy is impossible. 
Lastly, for practical purposes it is important that a remedy 
is not costly to implement. In this regard, market damages and 
specific performance are favored over lost profits when a thick spot 
market exists. This is because only the market price is needed tor 
market damages and specific performance has no informational 
requirements, but for lost profits it is necessary to know the exact 
production costs of the grievant. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We have shown, perhaps not surprisingly, that each remedy has 
its advantages and disadvantages. As an expectation interest remedy, 
specific performance is the best, but it can be inefficient. Market 
damages generally undercompensates the seller and is ambiguous as an 
expec~ation interest remedy when the spot market price is greater than 
the contract price. Lost profits, though it is neither efficient nor 
protective of expectation interest, is consistent in overcompensating 
the seller and costly to implement. Thus, it is difficult to decide 
which remedy is best for all situations. 
However, when we consider particular circUmstances it is clear 
in each case that one remedy is better than the rest. If the spot 
market is thick, lost profits can be ruled out since it is costly to 
compute and in this case both inefficient and overcompensating. 
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Specific performance will protect the seller's expectation exactly, 
but will be inefficient for large reselling costs. Thus for low 
reselling costs specific performance is best. As the reselling costs 
become higher, market damages may become a better alternative. 
Certainly it will be undercompensatory but that will be traded off 
with the likely gain in efficiency since less is resold under market 
damages than under specific performance. Finally, lost profits is 
ideal when the spot market is thin or non-existent. In this case 
market damages is difficult to compute since it is not clear what the 
spot market price is. Furthermore, it will be very undercompensatory 
since there are virtually no resales. Specific performance will tend 
to be very inefficient since it will frequently force the buyer to 
keep the goods. The problem of overcompensation of lost profits will 
vanisn since the thin or non-existent resale market implies the profit 
is really lost. Similarly the inefficiency due to the 
overcompensation being greater for sellers with more market power, 
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A. COUPETITIVE ASSUMPTION 
We will first solve the buyer's problem at the time the random 
demand is revealed for each remedy and determine the seller's profits 
under each remedy. Then the seller's profit under specific 
performance will be compared with those under the other two remedies. 
1. Lost Profits. 
The buyer's problem is as follows: 
maX T ( Q ) + Q ( p - r) - KZ - PQ + rob 
c s p 0 c,Qs,Qb,Qp 
subject to Q c + Q s + ~ - z + Qp 
Qc L O,Qs L 0,~ L O,QP L o. 
Let us solve for Q and substitute into the objective function. 
c 
max T ( Z + QP - Qs - ~) + Q s ( P - r) - KZ + rob - PQ 
0g, 0B,QP P 
subject to 
We define 
Qs + ~ + ~ Z + QP 
Qs l O,Qb L O,QP l 0. 
L = T(Z + Q - Q - Q ) + Q (P - r) - KZ + ro - PQ 
p s b s b b 





and the first order conditions that follow are 
_11. = 
a as 
-t ( ·) + C - A. + a = 0 
_11. = 
aab 
-t ( ·) + P - r - A. + fl = 0 
.1.1. = t ( • ) - p + ).. + y = 0 
a~ 
A.(Z + Qp - Q - ~) s = 0 ).. l 0 
aQ = s 0 a l 0 
flQb = 0 fl l 0 
yQP = 0 y l 0 
Looking at the first three conditions, 
t ( •) = fl + P - r - A. 
-y + p - ).. 
Z + QP - Qs - ~ l 0 
Qs ~ 0 
Qb l 0 
Q ~ o. 
p 
we see that no two of a,fl,y can simultaneously be zero for the 
equations in (AS) to remain consistent. Thus the buyer engages in 
only one of the three activities of reselling, breaching and 
purchasing at a time. Since the buyer always consumes a nonzero 
amount , A. = 0 • 
(A4) 
(AS) 
Suppose Qs > 0 then a= O,fl > O,y > 0 and Qb = 0, Qp = 0. The 
system of equations (A4) becomes 





Z- t (C), ~ = 0, QP = 0 (A6) 
If Qb > 0, then a > 0, ~ = 0, y > 0, Qs = 0, QP = 0 and (A4) reduces 
to 
-t (Z - ~) + P - r = 0 
or 
Z- t-1(P- r), Q = 0 
p 
(A7) 
Finally if Qp > 0, then a > 0, ~ > 0, y = 0, Qs = 0, Qb = 0 and (A4) 
becomes 
or 
t (Z + Q ) - P = 0 
p 
To determine when each case will occur, we need to consider the 
conditions on the multipliers associated with each. Let us begin 
(AS) 
again with Q > 0, which implies ~ > 0, y > 0. If we equate the three 
s 
expressions in (AS), recalling that a= 0 and A= 0 
C = ~ + P - r = -y + P, (A9) 
we deduce that 
~ > 0 
y > 0 
Q > 0 s 
-7 C>P-r 
-7 c < p 
-7 Z - t-1 (C) > 0 
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-7 t (Z) < C 
Since it is always true that C < P, (A6) is characterized by 
C > P- r, and t(Z) < C. 
If we apply the same procedure to (A7) we find that 
a > 0 
'Y > 0 
~ > 0 
a + C = P - r = -y + P, 
-7 P-r>C 
-7 P-r)C 
-7 Z - t -l (P - r) > 0 t (Z) < P - r 
and the relevant conditions are P- r > C, and T(Z) < P- r. 
Finally for (AS) we find 
a+C=J3+P-r=P 
a > 0 
13 > 0 
Q > 0 p 
-7 c < p 
-7 P-r<P 






The first two conditions in (A14) are always true and the last one, 
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p < t(Z)) defines the case. 
Combining (A6) to (A14) we get the complete solution. 
0, 0] 
C> (P-r) 
-1 [ t (P-r), -1 0 ,Z-t (P-r), 0] 
( t (Z) (max {P-r, C} 
C~ (P-r) 
z, 0, 0, 0] max{P-r,C}~(t(Z)~P) 
0, P<(t(Z)). 
The seller's profit when the buyer breaches is 
max [P(Q) - C]Q + (K - C)Z. 
Q 
2. Market Damages 
In this case the buyer's objective function is 
0c = Z - ~ - 0 s + QP 
subject to Q L o,o_ L O,Q 2 O,Q 2 0. c 0 s p 
p < K 
P 2 K 
We will solve each case separately. For P < K we see that breach 
(A15) 
(A16) 
always dominates resale. Incorporating this fact, substituting for Q 
c 
and adding the constraints with their multipliers we define 
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L = T(Z - ~ + Qp) - KZ + PQb - PQP 
+ A. (Z + Qp - ~) + ~Qb + yQP • 
The first order conditions associated with maximizing (A17) are 
_11. = -t (.) + p - A. + ~ = 0 
aab 
_11. = t (.) - p + a a p 
A(Z + Qp 
A + y = 0 
- Q ) 
b = 0 
~Qb = 0 
yQ =0 p 
A l 0 
~ l o 
r l 0 
z + QP - Qb l o 
Qb l o 
Q .L 0. p 
For P .L K, the buyer will prefer to resell than breach 
L = T(Z - ~ - Qs + QP) + (P - r)Qs - KZ + KQb - PQb 





and the corresponding first order conditions are 
_11. = -t ( •) + P - r - A. + a = 0 
aos 
_11. = -t ( •) + K - A. + ~ = 0 
aob 
J1. = t( ·> - P + A. + r = o ao 
p 
A. (Z + Q - Q - o_ ) = o 
p s [) 
aQ = 0 s 
~Q = 0 b 
yQP = 0 
A. l 0 
a l 0 
~ l o 
r l o 
Z-Q -Q 2.0 
p s 
Q 2. 0 s 
~ l o 
Q 2 0 
p 
(A20) 
The solution to (A18) and (A20) can be deduced in a similar fashion to 
the previous lost profits case. The system (A18) reduces to 
[t-1 (P),Z- t-1 (P), 
[t-1 (P), 0, 
and (A20) becomes 
Qc t-1 (P - r) t-1 (K) 
Qb 0 z - t - 1 (K) 
= 
Qs z - -1 t (P - r) 0 
Q 
0 0 p 
K.{P-r K > p- r 
\. ) v-
t(Z) < max{P- r,K} 
0, 0] t(Z) < P 
p < K, 
t(Z) l P 
z t - 1 (P) 
0 0 
0 0 
0 t-1 (P) - Z 
'-v---J "-,--' 
P > t(Z) 
l max{P - r,K) t(Z) l P 
P 2K 
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and combining the two we get 
Qc t-1 (P) t-l(P - r) t-l(K) 
Qb Z - t-l(P) 0 z- t-1 (K) 
= 
Qs 0 z - -1 t (P -r) 0 
Q . o 0 0 p 
K .{ p - r K > p - r 
'--
t(Z) < max{P- r,K} 
p < K P L K 
0 0 
max {P - r, K} 
.{t(Z) - P 
---------------------r-----------------------__) 
t (Z) < P t (Z) l P 
The seller's profit when the buyer breaches is given by 
m 
7t = max Q 
[P(Q) - C]Q + [K- P(Q))[Z- t-1 (P)] + [K- C]t-l(P) 
[P(Q) - C]Q + [K - C]t-1 (K) 
3. Specific Performance 
Here the buyer's objective function is 
max 
0 c' 0 s' QP 
subject to 
T(Q ) + (P - r)Q - IZ - PQP 
c s 
Z+Q -Q -Q =0 
p c s 
We define L as before 
(A21) 
p < K 




L = T(Z + Q - Q ) + (P - r)Q - KZ - PQ 
p s s p 
+ A. (Z + Q - Q ) + aQ + yQP, 
p s s 
and the first order conditions are 
~ = -t( •) + P - r - A. + a = 0 
aQs 
aL _ < > aQ- t• -P+A.+y=O 
p 
A. (Z + QP - Qs) = 0 
aQ = 0 s 
A. l o Z+Q -Q 20 p s 
The solution is 
yQ =0 
p 
a l 0 
y l o 
Qs 2 0 




[t-l(P- r) ,Z -
[Qc,Qs,Qp] = [ Z, 




t (Z) < P - r 
P- r ~ t(Z) ~ P 
[t-l(P), O,t-1 (P) - Z] 
The profit to the seller under specific performance is 
t
[P(X) - C]Q + (K - C)Z 
ns = m~x [P(Q) C]Q + (K - C)Z 
[P(Y) - C]Q + (K - C)Z 
t (Z) < P - r 
P 2 t(Z) 2 P- r 
t (Z) > P 
P < t(Z). 




4. Comparison of Remedies 
We will show here that lost profits overcompensates the seller 
and market damages usually undercompensates the seller. This is 
achieved by comparing the seller's profit when the buyer breaches 
under each of the lost profits and market damages with the profit the 
seller makes under specific performance. Since it is never the case 
that a buyer would purchase under specific performance when he would 
have breached under the other two remedies, it is not necessary to 
consider the last branch of (A27), where the buyer purchases under 
specific performance. Recall equations (A15) and (A27). 
1ft = max [P(Q) - C]Q + [K - C]Z (A15) 
Q 
{[P(X) - C]Q + [K - C]Z t(Z) < p - r s = max 1T [P(Q) - C]Q + [K - C]Z t(Z) Q l. P - r 
where X = Q + Z - t-l(P(X) - r) • (A27) 
If we take the difference between nt and ns, for t(Z) l. P - r it is 
zero, but for t(Z) < P - r it is positive. To see the latter claim, 
suppose Q• and x*, (X• = Q• + Z- t-1 (P(X•) - r)), maximized (A27) for 
the case t(Z) < P - r. If we substitute Q = Q• in (A15) then nt will 
• • be greater than or equal to the evaluation of (A15) at Q = Q since Q 
may not be the optimal choice of Q for (A15). Thus 
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• • > [P(X ) - C]Q + [K - C]Z = 
since x• > a• and so P(X•) < P(Q•). 
s n , 
We notice that the greater r is, the more unlikely the 
(A28) 
t(Z) < P - r, thus the buyer is less likely to engage in any resale 
under specific performance. Also this is exactly when lost profits is 
likely to compensate exactly. Even if t(Z) < P - r, the greater r is 
the smaller Z - t-1 (P(X) - r) is (that is, smaller amounts are resold 
by the buyer under specific performance) and the smaller the 
overcompensation. 
For market damages we will first look at the case when P < K. 
We can rewrite the seller's profit 
m n = max [P(Q) - C][Q- t-1 (P(Q))] + [K- P(Q)]Z (A29) 
Q 
Under specific performance either t(Z) < P(X) - r or t(Z) L P(X) - r. 
Let us first consider the case of t(Z) < P(X) - r. We can state the 
seller's profits for this case with an expression very similar to 
(A29). 
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s = max [P(X) - C]Q + (K - C)Z where X = Q + Z - t-1 (P{X) - r) 1f 
Q 
= max [P(X) - C]X - [P(X) - C] [Z - t-1 (P(X) - r)] + [K - C]Z 
X 
= max [P(X) - C] [X + t-
1 (P(X) - r)] + [(K- C) - (P{X) - C)]Z 
X 
= max [P(X) - C][X + t-1 (P(X) - r)] + [K- P(X)]Z. 
X 
(A30) 
The optimizations in (A29) and (A30) are very similar. 
• • Suppose Q solves (A29). Let us evaluate (A30) at X = Q • Since 
• • -1 P(Q)- r < P(Q ), and t (•) is downward sloping 
• Thus the evaluation of (A30) at X = Q 
will be greater than the evaluation of (A29) at Q* which is nm. On 
• the other hand, X = Q may not be the optimal choice of X for the 
problem in (A30) so that ns will be greater than or equal to the 
evaluation of (A30) at X= Q•. It clearly follows that ns > nm, for 
the case of t(Z) < P(X) - r. 
With a parallel argument we can show that for t(Z) L P(X) - r, 
it will still be the case that ns L m n • We can rewrite the expression 
for nm in the following manner 
m n = max [P(Q) C]Q + [K- P(Q)][Z- t-l(P)] + [K- C]t-1 (P) 
Q 




max [P(Q) - C]Q + (K - C)Z~ (A27) 
Q 
for the case under consideration. Suppose Q• maximizes (A31) 1 then 
the evaluation of (A27) at Q = Q. will be greater than nm~ which is 
the evaluation of (A31) at Q = Q. since Q*- t-1 (P(Q*)) < Q·. But 
since it is not clear that • Q maximizes (A27) # ns will be at least as 
(A27) • ns m great at the evaluation of at Q = Q • Thus > 7T for both 
cases_ and market damages undercompensates the seller_ when P(Q) < K. 
For P(Q) l K the result is not as straightforward. The 




[P(Q) - C]Q + [K - C]t-l(K) 
and the buyer will breach whenever t(Z) < K and K > P - r (where P is 
the price in that obtains in the spot market when the remedy is market 
damages). If we compare the profit above with that under specific 
performance 
{
[P(X) - C]Q + [K - C]Z 
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s max 
= Q [P(Q) - C]Q + [K - C]Z 
t (Z) < P - r 
t (Z) l P - r 
we find that if the maximum occurs on the second branch (t(Z) l P- r) 
then market damages undercompensates. This can be seen by simply 
observing that the first term~ [P(Z) - C]Q~ is present in both 
problems and the second term in each case is independent of Q. Thus 
both objective functions will be maximized at the same value of Q; the 
optimized value of the first term in each case will thus be the same. 
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Since [K- C]Z is larger than [K- C] + t-1 (K), ns will be greater 
than nm and market damages will undercompensate. However if ns is 
maximizea on the first branch (t(Z) < P- r), we cannot determine the 
sign of nm - ns since the profit in the spot market will be larger for 
market damages than specific performance but the opposite is true for 
the contract market. 
B. STACKELB FXG ASSUMPTION 
As in the competitive case, the buyer's problem under each 
remedy is solved and an expression for the seller's profit in each 
case is obtained. Then lost profits and market damages are compared 
with specific performance to determine how well each protects the 
seller's expectations. 
1. Lost Profits 
The buyer's problem 
max 
Qc Q , s 
T ( Q c) + P ( Q + Q ) Q + ( Z - Qc - Q ) C - KZ s s s 
subject to Q + Q ~ Z, Q L 0 
c s c 
is rewritten as follows to accommodate the constraints 
L = T(Q ) + P(Q + Q )Q + (Z - Q - Q )C 
c s s c s 
- KZ + A(Z - Q - Q ) + ~Qc. c s 
The corresponding first order conditions are 
(A32) 
(A33) 
aL = t(Q ) - c- A. + ll = 0 an c c 
_j1. = P(Q + Q ) - C + Q P(Q + Qs) 
aos s s 
A.(Z - Q - Q ) = 0 
c s 
llQ = 0 c 
and they yield the solution 
[t-l(C) ,R(Q;C) 
[Qc' 0 s' Qb] = [Z- Q R(Q·t((Z-s, , 
[t-l(P),Z- t-1 (P) 
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- A. = 0 
A. l 0 
11 l 0 
(A34) 
,Z - Q - Q ] Q > D} t (Z) < p c s 
Qs)), 0] Q .{ D 
0] t(Z) l P 
where Q .{ D is equivalent to t-1 (C) + R(Q;C) l Z. (A35) 
The profit to the seller when the buyer breaches is 
1tl = (K- C)Z + [P(QL + EL(QL))- C]QL (A36) 
where QL is the optimal choice of Q for the seller and m. L ( ·) 




Q > D 
Q .{ D 
describing the buyer's decision. 
2. Market Damages 
Now the buyer's problem is 
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{ 
T(Qc) + QsP(Q + Qs) - K(Qc + Qs) - [K - P( •) 1~ 
max 
Q , Q , Qb T ( Q ) + Q p ( Q + Qs) - K ( Q + Q ) c s c s c s 
p < K 
P 2 K. 
subject to Z Q + Q + Qb , Q ' 0 c s c ~ (A37) 
For P < K, clearly breach dominates reselling so that the 
problem becomes 
max T(Q) - KQ - [K- P(Q)1[Z- Q 1 
Q c c c 
c 
subject to Q .{ z 
c 
(A3 9) 
unless t(Z) l P, in which case the buyer will not be breaching or 
reselling, but instead buying in the spot market. The solution for 
this case is 
rt-l(P). O,Z- Q 1 t(Z) < p} p c 
[QC 1Qs10b1 
= [t-1 (P) 
1
Z - t-1 (P) I 
< K 
01 t(Z) l P 
(A40) 
For P L K the buyer's problem is 
max T(Q ) + Q P(Q + Q ) - K(Q + Qs) 
c s s c 
Q IQ s c 
sub j e c t to Q + Q ~ Z 1 ( A41 ) c s 
which is very similar to the buyer's lost profits problem. Thus the 
solution is similar 
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-1 z - Q - Q ] [t (K),R{Q;K), c s 
[Qc,Qs,Qb] = [Z- Qs,R(Q;t(Z- Qs)), 0] 
0] 
Q)E} t (Z) 
~E 
t (Z) > 
where Q ~ E is equivalent to t-1 (K) + R(Q;K) .L z. 
Combining (A38) and (A40) the complete solution is 
P,LK. 
(A42) 
0, z- Q ] 
c 
R(Q;K),Z- Q - Q] Q > c s :} 
p < K} t(Z) 
p .L K 
0] Q ~ 
< p 
0] t(Z) 2. P, 
(A43) 
and the profit to the seller when the buyer breaches is 
t-l(P) + [K- P(Q)][Z- t-l(P)] + P(Q)Q- C[Q + t-1 (P)] 
m 
1t = max p < K 
Q 
[t-1 (K) + R(Q;K)] + P(Q + R(Q;K))Q- C[Q + t-1 (K) + R(Q;K)] 
p .L K 
and the associated first order conditions are 
BL = -t( •) + P(P + Q ) + P' (Q + Q )Q - A. = 0 
BQ s s s 
s 
a <z - Q > = o s 
The solution to (A46) is 




t(Z) < P 
(A47) 
t(Z) 2. P. 
Since under the other two remedies, the buyer breaches only 
for the case t(Z) < P, we are interested in the seller's profit under 
specific performance for t(Z) < P. 
ns = max (K - C)Z + [P(Q + E s(Q)) - C]Q (A48) 
Q 
where E. s(Q) is the solution to Q = R(Q;t(Z- Q )) • 
s s 
4. Comparison of remedies. 
We will first compare lost profits with specific pertormance. 
1ft = max (K C)Z + [P ( Q + E. L ( Q)) - C] Q (A36) 
Q 
= (K - C)Z + ma:x[P(Q + EL(Q)) - C]Q Q 
s (K C)Z + [P(Q + E. s(Q)) - C]Q 1T max (A48) 
Q 
= (K - C)Z + max [P ( Q + E. s + ( Q) ) _ C]Q Q 
The first term is common to both and is constant with respect to Q. 
The second term differs only in the reaction of the contract buyer to 
the seller's quantity choice. 
:m 5 (Q) = R(Q;t(Z-Q)) 
s 
Q > D 
Q ~ D 
(A49) 
For Q > D, t-l(C) + R(Z;C) < Z. 
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But R(Q;C) = Q , so that 
s 
t-1 (C) + Q < Z or t-1 (C) < Z- Q which implies that C > t(Z- Q ). s s s 
Thus R(Q;C) < R(Q;t(Z- Q )) since the reaction to higher costs is a s 
smaller reselling choice. We conclude that E L (Q) ! m. s(Q) and the 
inequality is strict for Q > D. Since we wish to compare the profits 
of the seller under the two remedies only when the buyer would have 
breached under lost profits, the relevant region is when Q > D and 
thus :m. L < Q) < m s < Q) • 




< [K- C]Z + P(Q• + EL(Q.))- C]Q• 
t ! 1T , 
since Q may not be the optimal choice of Q under lost profits. 
Therefore lost profits overcompensates the seller. 
For the case of market damages, 
(ASO) 
t-1 (P) + [K- P(Q)][Z- t-l(P)] + P(Q)Q- C[Q + t-l(P)J 
m max 
1T = Q 
K • [t-l(K) + R(Q;K)] + P(Q + R(Q;K))Q- C[Q + t-1 (K) 
we will first look at P < K. 
p < K 
+ R( Q; K)] 
p 2. K 
(A44) 
nm =max K • t-1 (P) + [K- P(Q)][Z- t-1 (P)] + P(Q)Q- C[Q + t-l(P)] 
Q 
= max K- P(Q)]Z + [P(Q) - C][Q + t-l(P)]. (A45) 
Q 
On the other hand, if we arrange terms, 
s = [K C]Z + [P(Q + Q ) - C]Q 7t max 
Q s 
= max [K P(Q + Q )]Z + [P(Q + Qs) - C) [Q + Z] 
Q s 
= max [K - P(X) ]Z + [P(X)- C][X + Z- Q ]. 
Q s 
where X = Q+ Q s (A46) 
The only difference between (A45) and (A46) is that we have t-1 (P) 




P(Q + Q ) + P (Q + Q )Q = t(Z - Q ) • s s s s 
Since X= Q + Q , we can make the substitution, and we get that 
s 
, 




In (A46), instead of t-1 (P) we have t-1 (P + p'Q ). These two terms 
s , , 
are different as long as P Q ~ 0. In general P Q = 0 whenever 
s s 
Q = 0 From (A48), if Q = 0 then t-1 (P) = Z or P = t(Z). But we s • s 
are only interested in the case when P > t(Z), since this is when the 
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, , 
buyer breaches. Thus P Q :/: 0. Since P > P + P Q , s s 




) = Z- Qs • 
• If Q maximizes (A45) then 
• • • m n = [K - P(Q )]Z + [P(Q ) - C] [Q + 
• [P(Q•) • < [K - P(Q ) ]Z + - C] [Q + 
t-l(P(Q.))] 
(Z - Q ) ) ] 
s 




• = Q 
Thus market damages still undercompensates the seller when P < K. 
For P 2. K, 
m 






Unfortunately, this case is ambiguous. If we compare with the profit 
under specific performance, 
n s = max ( K - C) Z + [ P ( Q + E s ( Q) ) - C] Q. (A46) 
Q 
As in the lost profits case E m(Q) i m. s(Q) so that in the spot market 
alone, there would be more profit under market damages. However since 
the optimization in (ASO) occurs over both spot and contract market, 
and the profit in the contract market is less under market damages, 
the final outcome is ambiguous in general. 
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EQUiLIBRIUM PRICING IN HETEROGENEOUS GOODS MARKETS 
UNDER IMPERFEcr INFORMATION ABOUT PRICE AND QUALITY 
I. INTRODUCIION 
There is a large body of literature on how the distribution of 
prices offered in the market is affected by the amount of information 
consumers have about prices. This area was initially explored in the 
context of homogeneous products. It was assumed that it is costly for 
a consumer to become informed. Consumers were divided into two types 
depending upon whether their preferences were such that they would 
choose to become informed. The standard result of these models is 
that the market is badly behaved, that is, there is price dispersion 
above competitive prices, whenever there is an insufficient proportion 
of consumers being informed. This is best illustrated in a paper by 
Wilde and Schwartz [1979] where consumers of one group, the non-
shoppers, purchase from the first firm they encounter and each 
consumer of the other group, the shoppers, randomly sample a fixed 
number of firms and then buy from the firm with the lowest price. 
The problem was then generalized to heterogeneous product 
markets. Even in this case, the result is that the consumers need to 
be sufficiently informed for competitive outcomes. An important 
assumption made in this literature, is that the consumer is able to 
compare the firms he has sampled in order to decide which to purchase 
from. In the case of homogeneous goods, this assumption is quite 
innocuous. It simply means that consumers are able to compare prices. 
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However, in the heterogeneous market setting, the assumption is 
substantially stronger. It requires that consumers be able to 
distinguish between the different types of quality and then be able to 
compare the price-quality pairs they have sampled, in order to 
determine which is best. 
In this work, the consequences of relaxing this assumption are 
examined. There are two quality levels. Uninformed consumers are 
assumed to have a rough idea of the attributes the generic product 
that they seek ought to have. From this concept of the generic 
product they have a limit price which reflects the maximum they are 
willing to pay for the product. They are assumed to have no prior 
information about the existing distribution of firms, nor have any 
subjective distribution in mind. Thus, after visiting a store, an 
uninformed consumer does not perform any updating and therefore there 
is no revising of his limit price. Instead, given that the product 
satisfied the basic attributes, he presumes that what he just saw is, 
in fact, the generic product. Only after consumption is the total set 
of attributes realized. 
This is quite common in the actual consumer experience. For 
example a consumer buying a used car may perform all the tests 
required to check that the engine is sound, and after the purchase 
realize that the car seat gives him a backache. Similarly, positive 
attributes can also be discovered after the purchase. 
Three models are developed which incorporate different 
assumptions about the initial state of information and the extent to 
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which the state of information can change during the shopping process. 
In each model, the true preferences of the consumers are that they 
prefer the high quality product to the low quality product at the same 
price. Furthermore, it is assumed that at competitive prices (these 
will be defined in section 2) consumers prefer high quality products 
to low quality products. Thus, we can judge how badly behaved the 
market is by comparing the equilibrium distribution of firms to the 
competitive equilibrium with all firms in the high quality market. 
In the first model, initially all consumers are uninformed 
about quality. However, they can learn by shopping, if they encounter 
products of different quality levels. The reasoning here is that 
ordinarily these consumers are insensitive to certain attributes. If 
they observe two products of the same quality then they ignore the 
remaining attributes, assuming that these are standard in the generic 
product. However, if they observe two products of different quality, 
they realize that there are quality differences, and they become 
sensitive to the full set of attributes. Then, they will compute a 
new set of limit prices for each quality level. This behavior can be 
justified by means of a bounded rationality argument. The consumer is 
faced with the problem of making decisions about a multi-attribute 
commoaity. To make an optimal decision, incorporating all the 
attributes is too costly. In some cases, to even list all the 
attributes may be impossible for the consumer. So the consumer has a 
subset of attributes on which he concentrates. However, when he 
discovers that there are variations in other attributes that matter to 
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him, he becomes sensitive to these attributes as well. 
A certain proportion of the population of consumers are 
shoppers, and they sample exactly two firms before purchasing. In the 
process, some of this group becomes informed about quality variation 
in the market when they sample from firms of two different quality 
levels. The remainder are non-shoppers and purchase from the first 
store that they come to. This group always remains uninformed at the 
time of purchase. 
The qualitative results of this model are that if a sufficient 
proportion of the consumers are shoppers then the resulting 
equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium with all firms existing in 
the high quality market. If the proportion of shoppers falls below a 
crit1cal level there is necessarily quality deterioration and pricing 
above competitive prices in both markets. This model is developed 1n 
section 2. 
Section 3 consists of two models which are variations of the 
original model. The first allows a certain proportion of all 
consumers, shoppers and non-shoppers, to be naturally informed. As in 
the original model, it is possible for the uninformed shoppers to 
become informed during the shopping process. The results are as 
expected. For very small proportions of naturally informed consumers, 
the equilibrium properties of this version are qualitatively similar 
to the original model. As the proportion of naturally informed 
consumers increases, the market is less badly behaved and approaches 
the Schwartz and Wilde warranties model (1982). 
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Schwartz and Wilde (1982) define comparative advantage to be 
in the market where the least demand is needed for a firm to break 
even when it is charging the limit prices. They get the result that 
when the proportion of shoppers is not large enough to guarantee a 
competitive equilibrium, quality deterioration will not occur unless 
the comparative advantages lies in the low quality market. The result 
in the second version of the model is quite similar. If the 
proportion of shoppers is too small to give a competitive equilibrium, 
then there is quality deterioration whenever the comparative advantage 
lies in the low quality market, or when the proportion of naturally 
informed consumers is too small and the comparative advantage lies in 
the high quality market. 
The last variation of the model in section 3 is where there is 
no learning by shopping. A certain proportion of the population is 
naturally informed and no more information can be gathered by 
shopping. As this model is computationally very difficult, it has 
been assumed that all consumers are shoppers. If the proportion of 
informed consumers is large enough the resulting equilibrium is a 
competitive equilibrium in the high quality market. If the proportion 
of informed consumers is too low, there is a competitive equilibrium 
in the low quality market. For intermediate values of the proportion 
of informed consumers, a variety of non-competitive equilibria arise, 
with a competitive price in one market and non-competitive pricing in 
the other market, or non-competitive pricing in both markets. These 
latter equilibria are mathematically complicated and some too 
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difficult to compute. 
The three models give three realistic situations of the 
in1tial state of information of consumers and how it changes in the 
shopping process. For a given market, which model is most applicable 
depends on how easy it is to become more informed about the quality 
variation in the market, while shopping, and whether the market is 
characterized by some consumers being naturally informed. 
Section 4 discusses the implications, conclusions and areas of 
further research. 
2 • THE MODEL 
In the market, two levels of quality of a product denoted by 
qL and qH, are offered at varying prices. The technology for 
produc1ng each quality ot the product is the same for all firms. 
However, a single firm may produce only one quality of products. For 
high quality products, there is a fixed cost FH, a marginal cost cH 
for each unit produced and a capacity constraint of SH. Similarly, 
for low quality products, the fixed cost is FL, the marginal cost cL 
and the capacity constraint SL. The competitive price in each market 
• is defined to be the minimum of the average cost. Thus pH, the 
FH 
competitive price in the high quality market is S + cH, and 
H 
We shall assume that the competitive price for high 
quality products is greater than the competitive price for low quality 
products, that the capacity constraint in the low quality market is 
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greater than the constraint in the high quality market, and that the 
average fixed cost at capacity in the low quality product is less than 




These are natural assumptions to make about the relationships that 
exist between the parameters of a low quality product cost function 
and a high quality product cost function. Clearly no firm can offer 
prices below the competitive prices. 
All consumers demand exactly one unit of the product. They 
enter the market and sample a fixed number of firms. The population 
is partitioned into two groups. The members of the group, which we 
refer to as shoppers, each sample exactly two firms and the members of 
the other group, known as non-shoppers, sample only one firm. The 
proportion of shoppers to the whole population is y, and the 
proportion of non-shoppers is 1 - y. 
All consumers have the same underlying preferences. There is 
a common limit price, L, for low quality products, which we shall 
• • assume is greater then pL, and a common limit price H ) pH for high 
quality products. However, before the search, consumers are not aware 
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that there are two quality levels being offered in the market. 
Instead, they have an idea of what the generic product is like, and 
they have a common limit price, R, for the generic product. We shall 
assume that R lies between H and L. Even after the search, consumers 
remain insensitive to quality, unless they have sampled products of 
both qualities. 
Hence, non-shoppers will buy as long as the firm they chose 
offers a price below or equal to R. Shoppers whose entire sample 
consists of one quality will purchase from the firm with the lowest 
price, as long as that price is below or equal to R. The shoppers 
whose draw consists of both qualities will chose the firm which leaves 
them with the greatest surplus. The surplus derived from choosing 
(pL, qL) is L - qL. Thus the shopper will be indifferent between 
(pL, qL) and (pH, qH) as long as pH = pL + H - L. In case of 
indifference, the consumer will choose either firm with probability f. 
In this way, the consumers are passive players that behave according 
to these rules. 
We shall assume that at competitive prices informed consumers 
will prefer high quality to low quality. Thus 
(4) 
Under this assumption, informed and uninformed consumers prefer 
different quality products at competitive prices. 
• The feasible set of prices that firms can offer is between pL 
• and K in the low quality market and between pH and H in the high 
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• • quality market. Below pL and p8 , firms are asking a price which is 
not sufficiently high to cover their average costs. No firm can locate 
at prices above R and H in the low and high quality markets 
respectively, and make a non-negative profit, since no consumer will 
buy at these prices. Firms will choose which price and quality pair 
to offer from the feasible set in order to maximize their profit. 
However, there will be free entry, so that as long as there are 
positive profits to be made firms will continue to enter. This 
completes the description of the model and its assumptions. 
Now we will introduce some concepts and notation which enable 
us to define an equilibrium. Let G8 (p) be the cumulative distribution 
function which gives the distribution of firms over prices in the high 
quality market, GL(p), the distribution of firms over prices in the 
low quality market, and ~ and nL be the proportion of the total firms 
producing in the high quality market and low quality markets 
respectively. Clearly ~ + ~ = 1. Since firms cannot locate outside 
the feas1ble set, the following conditions must hold: GH(p) = 0 for 
• P < p
8
, G8 (p) = 1 for p > H, when ~ > 0, (G8 (p) is not defined for 
• ~ 0); and GL(p) = 0 for p < pL, and GL(p) = 1 for p > R when 
~ > 0, (GL(p) is not defined for~= U). We denote a distribution 
of firms on the feasible set by GL(p), G8 (p), nL, nn>· 
Definition. An equilibrium is a consumer to firm ratio a, and 
a distribution <GL(p), G8 (p), nL, nH> such that the Nash condition is 
satisfied for any existing firm or potential entrant. 
In other words, given a consumer firm ratio a and a 
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distribution, there is no location in the feasible set where an 
entrant can enter and make positive profit or an existing firm can 
deviate and make higher profit. If we let the support of the 
distribution to be all points (p, qi) in the feasible set, such that 
, 
G. (p) exists and G. (p) I= 0 if it exists, (where i = H, L), then in 1 1 
equilibrium the profit earned at any point on the feasible set must be 
non-positive, with exactly zero profit being earned on the support of 
the distribution. Using this reasoning, we will restate the 
derin1tion of equilibrium in a more useful form. 
Let D(p, qi) denote the demand at (p, qi), i 




D(p, q.) = _....;;;;...._ 
1 p - C • I 
1 
H, L. 
i H, L. 
H, L, then zero 
The right hand side is the amount of demand needed in order that zero 
profit is earned at (p, qi). We will call this the break even demand 
F. 
and denote it by Z(p, qi)' i.e., Z(p, qi) = P _ 1c. i = H, L. It 
1 
follows that if the demand 1s greater than the break even demand at a 
point then positive profit may be earned at that location. 
Conversely, if the demand is below the break even demand then only 
negative profit may be earned. Now we can formally restate the 
98 
detin1tion of an equilibrium using the notion of break even demand. 
Definition. An equilibrium is a, <GH(p), GL(p), ~, ~>such 
that D(p, q.) ~ Z(p, q.) for all (p, q.) in the feas1ble set and 1 1 1 
equality holds on the support of the distribution. 
We are now equ1ppea with a definition of equilibrium that is 
easy to verify. Given a distribution, to decide whether or not it is 
an equilibrium, we simply compare actual demand to break even demand 
at each point in the feasible set. Equilibrium requires that demand 
not exceed break even demand on the feas1ble set, and equality holds 
on the support of the distribution. 
Let us determine the various types of equilibria that can 
obtain under different configurations of the parameters. An 
equilibrium is competitive if all firms are offering their products at 
competitive prices. We will first consider the competitive equilibria 
and the conditions under which they will exist. Then we will consider 
the non-competitive equilibria in a similar fashion. In what follows, 
we shall present intuitive arguments, and the formal proofs may be 
found in the appendix. 
A. Competitive Equilibria 
The only competitive equilibrium is one where all the firms 
offer the high quality product with the consumer firm ratio, a, being 
SH. To see this, suppose we had a competitive equilibrium with ~ 
firms offering low quality, ~ # 0 and nu = 1 - ~ firms offering high 
• quality. Then the demand for the products of any firm at (pL, qL) 
will be due to i) all non-shoppers who sample the firm, and ii) one 
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half ot the shoppers whose other draw was also a low quality firm. Of 
the shoppers whose other draw was a high quality no one will purchase 
since at competitive prices shoppers who see both products prefer the 
high quality product. Thus, 
For a firm offering the high quality product, the demand will be i) 
all the non-shoppers that sample it, ii) all the shoppers whose other 
draw was a low quality firm, and iii) one half of the shoppers whose 
other draw was another high quality firm. Thus, 
a(l-y) + 2aynL + ay. 
Now note that the demand for a high quality firm is greater 
than for a low quality firm. The break even demand for the high 
quality firm is SH which is less than ~L' the break even demand for 
the low quality firm. In equilibrium we need that the demand equal 
the break even demand on the support of the distribution. The only 
manner in which this can be achieved is if there were no firms at 
• • (pL, qL), since then D(pH, qH) = SH, by choosing a= SHand 
• D(pL, qL) < SL. Thus, the only possible competitive equilibrium is 
one where all firms are in the high quality market. 
Now we will show that a distribution with all firms offering 
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the competitive price in the high quality market is an equilibrium if 
the proportion of shoppers is sufficiently large. The other condition 
for equilibrium is that the demand be less than or equal to the break 
even demand for locations not on the support of the distribution. Now 
• if all the firms are at (p8 , q8 ), then the demand at any other point 
will be due to the non-shoppers only. Thus, the demand at any point 
will be a(l-y). We need that this be less than the break even demand. 
Let us find the point where break even demand is the least. If demand 
is less than break even demand at this point, then it will clearly be 
the case elsewhere since the break even demand is higher elsewhere. 
The break even demand is the least at (R, qL). To see this, observe 
that R is the highest price that can be offered in the low quality 
market. For a given quality level, the higher the price the lower the 
break even demand. The highest price that can be offered in the high 
quality market is also R s1nce the demand 1s due to the non-shoppers 
only. Clearly the break even demand at (R, qL) is lower than the 
break even demand at (R, q8 ) since it costs less to produce a low 
quality product than a high quality product. Thus the break even 
demand is lowest at (R, qL), and if demand is less than the break even 
demand at (R, qL), then it will also be true elsewhere in the feas1ble 
set. Therefore, we need 
R - c • 
L 
Since a = s8 , this condition is equivalent to 
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r > 1- s (R- >. 
H CL 
Th1s means that as long as the proportion of shoppers is sufficiently 
large. as detined in the above condition. we have the competitive 
equilibrium with all firms offering the high quality product at the 
competitive price. In the Appendix we show that the above condition 
is also a sufficient condition for a competitive equilibrium at 
Theorem 1. Tne only competitive equilibrium is one with all firms at 
• (pH' qH). The necessary and sufficient condition for this equilibrium 
F 
. . 1 / L 
to ex1st 1s -y ~ SH(R _ ~)· 
Proof: See Appendix. 
B. Non-Competitive Equilibria 
There are several types of non-competitive equilibria 
depending upon the properties of the cost functions and the limit 
prices. Before we can identify the different types, we will establish 
some properties that are common to all non-competitive equilibria. 
Lemma 1· In equilibrium, there cannot be any mass points except at 
competitive prices. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
We will present the intuitive argument behind this lemma. 
Suppose there was a mass point of size mi at (p, qi), where pis not a 
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competitive price for q .• Then, with the same quality for any price 
1 
below p, the demand will be greater than the demand at (p, q.) by at 
1 
least aym., since at (p, q.) only one half of the shoppers whose other 
1 1 
draw was also (p, q
1
) will buy, while at any price below, all the 
shoppers whose other draw was (p, q.) will buy. Similarly, with the 
1 
same quality, for any price above p, the demand will be less than the 
demand at (p, q.) by at least aym., since here none of the shoppers 
1 1 
whose other draw is (p, qi) will buy. Thus, in the qi quality market 
demand jumps down discontinuously at (p, q.) and again jumps down 
1 
discontinuously just above (p, q.). Since there are firms at (p, q.), 
1 1 
demand must equal break even demand at (p, qi). But now since break 
even demand is continuous in price, for prices below p demand will 
exceed break even demand, which cannot hold in equilibrium. This 
argument can be made for all prices p for which there are prices below 
p in the feasible set. Therefore there cannot be any mass points 
except at competitive prices. 
* FL 
No firms can exist at (p, q.) where pL ~ p <-- + ~. 
1 SH -L 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Basically, the lemma states that there cannot be any firms 
FL 
be1ow the price + ~, in the low quality market. This tollows 
SH -L 
easily, when we make the observation that in this range of prices, 
break even demand is less than s8 , which is the break even demand at 
• However, the demand at (pH' q8 ) is always higher than that 
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FL 
at prices below g- + ~ in the low quality market, since all informed 
H 
• consumers prefer (pH' qH). Thus if there are any firms at prices 
FL 
below g- +~(earning non-negative profit), then positive profit can 
H 
• be earned at (pH' qH). Clearly, in equilibrium there cannot be any 
firms in this range of the low quality market. 
Lemma ~. For every non-competitive equilibrum (R, qL) belongs to the 
support of the distribution, 
FL Sa<R - ~) - FL 
a = ( R c._ ) , and r < S - -L) ( 1 - 'Y H ( R - ~) 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Every non-competitive equilibrium contains (R, qL) in its 
support. Notice that no matter what the equilibrium distribution is, 
the demand at (R, qL) is a(1- y). If we had a non-competitive 
equilibrium distribution without, (R, qL) in its support, then the 
least preferred point in the support according to true preferences 
must either be a high quality firm, or a low quality firm offering a 
lower price. If it is a low quality firm or a high quality firm 
offering a price of at most R, then it can always improve its profits 
by moving to (R, qL), since its demand will be a(1- y) in both cases, 
but its costs will be less at (R, qL). If it is a firm offering a 
high quality product at prices greater than R, then its only demand is 
due to shoppers whose other sample is a low quality firm which is less 
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preferred. Thus the firm offering the lowest surplus cannot be a high 
qua1ity firm with prices greater than R. Hence every non-competitive 
equilibrium contains (R, qL). Since in equilibrium demand equals 
break even demand on the support, a(l - y) = FL/(R- cL) or 
a= FL/(R- cL)(1- y). The argument for why y must be less than 
s8 (R- ~) - FL is in the Appendix. s8 (R - ~) 
Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 contain general properties which are true 
of all non-competitive equilibria. Where the support of the 
distribution lies in a particular situation, depends upon two things: 
i) the relationships among the parameters of the cost function and the 
limit prices, and ii) the proportion of shoppers in the population of 
consumers. 
These two factors affect the equilibrium distribution of 
prices in quite different ways. The configuration of the cost 
parameters and limit prices restrict the support of the distribution 
to a subset of the feasible set. We call this subset the 'maximum 
support' of the distribution. In all, five different cases arise and 
these are depicted in f1·igures 1 through 5. Lemmas 4, 5, and 6 of the 
Appendix contain the conditions separating the different cases. 
In Lemma 4 the notion of comparative advantage, which was 
first introduced 1n this context by Schwartz and Wilde (1982), is 
generalized. Consider any price p, in the low quality market. In 
general, the demand at (p, qL) is the same as the demand at 
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non-shoppers is the same at each point, and the demand due to the 
shoppers will be the same as long as the shopper is indifferent 
between the two points. A shopper chosing between these two points 
must be informed since he observes both qualities, and thus will be 
indifferent whenever the premium for high quality is H - L. 
Therefore, the demand at (p, qL) is the same as the demand at 
(p + H- L, qH). In general, the break even demands at these two 
points will not be the same. The 'comparative advantage' at the price 
p, lies in the market with the lower break even demand. The price in 
the low quality market at which they are the same is affected by the 
parameters of the cost function and the limit prices. We shall say 
that the comparative advantage shifts from one market to the other at 
• this price, which is denoted by p • Clearly, at each price, in the 
low qua~ity market, firms can exist only in the market with the 
comparative advantage. To see this, suppose in equilibrium at certain 
prices there existed firms in the market without the comparative 
advantage. There firms must be earning zero profit since this is an 
equilibrium. But then at the corresponding prices in the market with 
the comparative advantage positive profit can necessarily be earned 
and this contradicts that this is an equilibrium. 
In this way, Lemma 4 introduces the generalized notion of 
comparative advantage at a price. Lemma 4 applies only to a certain 
range of prices, and Lemmas S and 6 explore the possibilities that 
arise when the price at which the comparative advantage shifts, lies 
outside the range of Lemma 4. The fundamental factor governing where 
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firms lie in the feastble set, is that zero profit should be earned on 
the support and non-positive profit should be earned off the support 
of the distribution. We use this rule repeatedly in Lemmas 5 and 6 to 
establish whether firms may lie in the low quality or high quality 
market in different price ranges. As these lemmas are quite technical 
and do not add significantly to the understanding of the model, they 
will not be discussed here. 
Once the maximum support of the distribution is determined by 
the configuration of the cost parameters and limit prices, the 
proportion of shoppers determines the actual support of the 
distribution. If the proportion of shoppers is sufficiently large 
(where "sufficient" is as defined in 1-heorem 1), then the equilibrium 
• is competitive with all firms offering {pH' qH). With a slightly 
smaller proportion of shoppers, a few firms deviate to high prices in 
the low quality market. As the proportion of shoppers continues to 
fall, the equilibrium distribution transforms itself, with a smaller 
mass of firms at the competitive price in the high quality market and 
• more firms dispersed in the maximum support, above (pH' qH). The 
order in which points from the maximum support are added to the actual 
support as y decreases in the order of increasing utility for the 
• inrormed consumer. Eventually, the mass point at (pH' qH) dissapears, 
and further reduction in the proportion of shoppers results in the 
shrinking of the actual support, in a manner that is exactly reverse 
to the inttial expansion of the actual support. Ultimately, the 
equilibrium distribution converges to the single point (R, qL) and 
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this occurs when the proportion of shoppers is zero. 
Thus, the relationships among the cost parameters and limit 
prices determine the maximum support, and the actual support of the 
equilibrium distribution is determined by the proportion of shoppers 
in the population. A complete mathematical classification of all the 
cases and rigorous proofs of all the necessary and sufficient 
conditions on y for each case are given in the Appendix. While this 
detailed classification is necessary in order to prove the conditions 
for each equilibrium and to ensure that the set of equilibria is 
exhaust1ve, it is more useful now to examine the economic aspects of 
the equilibria. 
The most significant observation is that there is quality 
deterioration in every non-competitive equilibrium. That is, whenever 
the proportion ot shoppers is not sufficiently large to yield a 
competitive equilibrium, there will always be some firms selling low 
quality products. This result differs from the one obtained by 
Schwartz and W1lde (1982), where all consumers are perfectly informed 
about quality, in that firms entered at the limit price in the market 
with the comparative advantage when the proportion of shoppers fell 
just below the critical level needed for competitive equilibrium. To 
explain this difference, note that the firms deviating to the high 
prices from the competitive equilibrium are attracting the non-
shoppers. In the Schwartz and Wilde model these consumers are able to 
distinguish between the quality levels and so it is necessary for 
firms to enter in the market with the comparative advantage at limit 
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prices. In this model it is advantageous for the firms to enter in 
the low quality market since the consumers cannot tell the difference 
between the two quality levels, and since costs are lower for 
producing low quality goods. 
Another similarity among the equilibria is that as we increase 
the proportion of shoppers, eventually there will be some firms 
offering the high quality product in equilibrium. This result concurs 
with Schwartz and Wilde, and is expected since the only competitive 
equilibrium is in the high quality market. 
We can separate the equilibria according to the following 
economically significant criteria: i) firms exist in the low quality 
market only, ii) firms exist in the high quality market only at prices 
below R, and iii) firms exist in the high quality market at prices 
above R. 
Firms existing in the low quality market only, indicates 
quality deterioration and non-competitive pricing. This can occur 
under all circumstances, as long as the proportion of shoppers is 
small enough. However, the critical proportion of shoppers in order 
that this occurs, differs for different configuration of the cost and 
demand parameters. For example, if the cost and demand parameters are 
as depicted in Figure 1, then the proportion of shoppers must be small 
• enough to allow the distribution to lie above p in the low quality 
market. On the other hand, for the situation in Figure 2, it is 
possible to have a larger proportion of shoppers and still maintain 
firms in the low quality market only, since in this case the 
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FL 
distribution can extend as low as g- + ~· In general the likelihood 
H 
that firms exist in the low quality market only. is greater. the lower 
the price is at which the comparative advantage changes from the low 
quality market to the high quality market. 
If firms exist in the high quality market at prices below K 
only. this indicates that there is not complete quality deterioration. 
and firms in the high quality market are unable to extract all the 
surplus from the informed consumer. This situation is possible in 
three of the five configurations of parameters. shown in Figure 1. 2. 
and 4. as 1ong as the proportion of shoppers is sufficiently large. 
In the first two configurations. firms cannot exist in the high 
quality market at prices above K. because the comparative advantage 
moves to the high quality market at a price below R. 
The case of Figure 4 is slightly more complicated. Here the 
comparative advantage is in the high quality market at prices above R. 
However. another factor prevents firms from existing at prices above 
R. In the high quality market. if we compare the demand at prices 
above R with the demand at R. we find above R. the only demand is due 
to shoppers whose other draw is a low quality firm. that is lower in 
the preference of the informed consumer. At R there is a surge in 
demand due to the non-shoppers. If there are firms at R in the high 
quality market. then there cannot be firms in an interval above R in 
the high quality market (and in an interval above R - H + L in the low 
quality market) since break even demand. which is continuous in 
prices. would exceed demand for prices in an interval above R. (A 
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similar sort of reasoning explains the corresponding gap in the low 
quality market for an interval above R- R + L.) 
Under the appropriate conditions 6 this gap can be large enough 
to preclude the existence of firms above R. The exact condition is 
roughly means that the comparative advantage at R in the high quality 
market must be sufficiently large that the break even demand in the 
low quality market exceeds that at (R6 q8 ) 6 for a large interval of 
prices above R- H + L. A simple sufficient condition is that the 
break even demand at (L, qL) exceeds that at (R6 q8 ). Thus 6 this case 
• occurs for very large p • 
Finally6 we consider the situation where firms exist in the 
high quality market at prices above K. This situation occurs in 
Figures 3 and 56 when there is a sufficiently large proportion of 
shoppers6 and is a result of the price at which the comparative 
advantage changes to the high quality market6 being greater than 
R- H + L6 but not very large (as was discussed in the previous case). 
The significance of this case is that some informed consumers are 
being fully exploited in the high quality market. The intuitive 
reasoning here is as follows: The consumers who buy at these prices 
are necessarily informed 6 since no uninformed consumer would buy at 
these prices. In order that they are informed, the other draw they 
made must have been a firm of low quality. That firm must have 
yielded a lower utility since they chose to buy from the high quality 
firm. Thus the high price low quality firms create an externality6 
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since their existence allows the existence of firms at high prices in 
the high quality market. Note in particular that for a firm to exist 
at (H~ q8 ) 1 it is necessary that there exist firms in the low quality 
market that yield a negative utility for the informed consumer. 
Thus the three economically relevant cases are governed by two 
factors: the proportion of shoppers and the price at which the 
comparative advantage changes from the low quality market to the high 
qua1ity market. Each case is as likely as the other~ in general. 
However, for a particular industry or type of production, we may be 
able to predict which cases are more likely~ as Schwartz and Wilde 
(1983J do in the case of warranties. 
3 • EXTENSION AND GENERALIZATIONS 
From the previous section we conclude that the market can be 
very badly behaved in a world where consumers learn about quality by 
shopping. If the proportion of shoppers is below a critical level~ 
then a non-competitive equilibrium results~ in which there is always 
quality deterioration and non-competitive pricing. Thus government 
policy should be aimed at reducing the cost of comparison shopping~ 
since insufficient shopping is the cause of the quality deterioration 
and non-competitive pricing. 
The nature of the equilibria is strongly influenced by the 
assumption that the only manner in which a consumer can know about 
quality variation in products is by sampling firms of different 
quality products. In this section~ we examine how sensitive the 
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equilibria are to this assumption. The model moves smoothly from a 
world of learning by shopping to a world of completely informed 
shoppers, via a parameter ~. In this case, there is quality 
deterioration whenever the comparative advantage at limit prices lies 
with low quality, or if a large enough proportion of the consumers are 
learning by shopping when the comparative advantage lies with high 
quality production. 
The last variation we consider is where a certain proportion 
of consumers is naturally informed and the remainder is uninformed and 
cannot learn by shopping. In this formulation, even when there are no 
non-shoppers we find quality deterioration occurring, when the 
proportion of informed consumers is low. Thus we realize that 
adequate comparison shopping is not enough to prevent quality 
deterioration in markets where some consumers are always uninformed 
about quality. 
A. Some Learning hY Shopping 
We now modify the original model so that a proportion ~ of all 
consumers are naturally aware of the two quality levels and thus are 
able to make decisions according to informed preferences. The other 
(1 - ~) of the consumers are able to learn about the quality 
differences if they observe products of different quality levels. The 
impact this change has on the behavior of the non-shoppers is that ~ 
of them will not buy at prices above L in the low quality market, but 
these same consumers will buy at prices between R and H in the high 
quality market. Similarly, of the shoppers, ~ of them will not buy if 
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both their draws are prices above L in the low quality market, but 
they will buy when both their draws are prices between R and H in the 
high quality market. 
The qualitative nature of the equilibria remains unchanged for 
small enough ~. There is a certain proportion of shoppers required 
for competitive equilibrium in the high quality market to obtain. No 
other competitive equilibria are possible. If there are too few 
shoppers then there is necessarily quality deterioration as well as 
non-competitive pricing in both markets. The only difference is that 
there is a discontinuous increase in demand at (L, qL) as we approach 
from above which is due to the addition of the informed consumers, who 
will not buy at prices above L in the low quality market. The 
discontinuity limits the amount of mass that can exist above L since 
in equilibrium the demand at (L, qL) must be at most the break even 
demand at (L, qL). As a result, there are no firms in the low quality 
market at prices for an interval above L. The argument here is 
identical to the arguments used previously when there is a 
discontinuity in demand. 
To find the critical level of ~~ below which the nature of the 
equ1librium is unchanged we observe the following. The competitive 
* equilibrium at (p
8
, q8 ) obtains whenever there is a sufficient 
proportion of shoppers. This means that profitable entry is not 
possible at any point in the feasible set. We will find qualitatively 
similar equilibria if the constraint of no profitable entry is binding 
at (R, qL). This follows because, if the inequality is not met, firms 
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will enter at (R, qL) as in the previous model. The critical ~ is 
found according to this argument; the exact value, ~~ is given in 
Lemma 8 of the Appendix. When ~ ! ~ the equilibria are very similar 
to those of the previous model. 
Now let us see what happens when ~ ) ~. If there are 
sufficient shoppers to permit a competitive equilibrium, then the only 
• possible competitive equilibrium is at (pH, q
8
). The reason is that 
all the previous arguments against any other competitive equilibrium 
still apply. If there are too few shoppers, then a must be chosen so 
that the demand equals the break even demand at the point in the 
feas1ble set where the most profit can be made. Clearly, this will 
depend on ~. At ~ = 1, everyone is informed and we are left with the 
Schwartz and Wilde model [1982]. The maximum support is either the 
• high quality market only, or on prices between p and L in the low 
• • quality market and p + H - L and pH in the high quality market, 
depending upon where the comparative advantage lies at limit prices. 
The former case obtains if the comparative advantage at limit prices 
is in the high quality market, that is Z(L, qi) ) Z(H, qH), and the 
latter can obtain if the comparative advantage is in the low quality 
market. 
Now we will examine the outcome for intermediate values of ~. 
There are two cases. Let us begin with the case where the comparative 
advantage of limit prices is in the low quality market, that is 
Z(L, qL) < Z(H, qH). As~ is increased above p the discontinuous jump 
in demand at (L, qL) increases, and so the interval on which firms may 
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not exist in the low quality market, increases. At the same time, the 
jump in demand at (R, q8 ) due to uninformed consumers entering at R is 
decreasing and so the gap in the maximum support, at prices just above 
R in the high quality market is reducing. At f3 = R - L the jump in 
R- CL 
demand at (L, qL) is so large that no firms can exist at prices above 
L in the low quality market. This is shown in Lemma 9 of the 
Appendix. As we continue to increase f3, the gap in the high quality 
market, at prices just above K, becomes smaller until f3 = 1 when there 
is no gap. 
If the comparative advantage at limit prices lies in the high 
quality market, then several possibilities arise. These are discussed 
in more detail in the Appendix. In general, four processes are taking 
place. First, there is a discontinuity in demand at (L, qL) due to 
informed consumers refusing to buy at prices above L in the low 
quality market. This creates a gap in the equilibrium distribution 
for an interval just above L. As we increase p, this gap grows until 
finally there are no firms between L and R. Second, there is a gap in 
the distribution at prices above R in the high quality market, and 
prices above R - H + L in the low quality market, due to the fact that 
uninformed non-shoppers will not buy at prices above R in the high 
quality market and this creates a discontinuity of demand at (R, q8). 
As f3 increases, this gap decreases since more and more non-shoppers 
are becoming 1nformed. Next, the lowest price at which firms can 
exist in the low qua~ity market is increasing as f3 increases. As f3 
• tends to 1, this price tends to p , which is greater than L by the 
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assumption that the compartative advantage at limit prices lies in the 
high quality market. Finally, the highest price at which firms can 
exist in the high quality market is increasing as ~ increases. 
Different possibilities occur depending upon the different 
times at which the above four processes are complete. In some 
instances, the transition to the high quality market occurs directly. 
That is, initially the point at which only the non-shoppers purchase 
is (R, qL). As~ increases the distribution in the low quality market 
slowly erodes away, and the point at which only the non-shopper 
purchase is (H, qH). At other instances, the transition occurs 
indirectly. The firm catering exclusively to non-shoppers is 
initially at (R, qL) then it moves to (L, qL), or in some cases to 
(R, qH), and finally it is at (H, qH). 
The classification of the different maximum supports under the 
different conditions is not of great interest in itself. It has been 
includea nere for completeness. The factor of interest is under what 
conditions will there be no quality deterioration. In the Appendix, we 
• show that there is a critical value p such that when the comparative 
• advantage lies with high quality products, ~ ) p is the condition for 
no quality deterioration. Thus, we have quality deterioration when 
the proportion of shoppers is too low and the comparative advantage 
lies with low quality. We also have quality deterioration when the 
comparative advantage lies with high quality and we have too few 
• shoppers, if ~ is below ~ • 
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B. Naturally Informed Consumers 
The final variation of the model is when there is no learning 
by shopping. A certain proportion, ~, of the consumers is naturally 
informed about quality and the remainder of the consumers is 
insensitive to quality, at the time of purchase. Since the equilibria 
in this model are extremely difficult to compute, we will make some 
simplifying assumptions. 
First we will assume that there are no non-shoppers. This 
will reduce the different types of consumers and thus uncomplicate the 
equilibria. Next we will assume that the fixed costs are the same in 
both technologies, FH = FL = F, and the capacity constraints are also 
the same, SH = SL = S. So the only difference in the costs are 
marginal costs cH and cL. The purpose of these assumptions is to 
demonstrate how badly behaved the market equilibria are, even under 
these strong simplifying assumptions. The assumptions about how the 
competitive prices and the limit prices are related are maintained 
from the first model. Thus 
which is equivalent to 
123 
Define cH - cL = Kc and H - L - (cH - cL) = K6 • This will allow us to 
write expressions without excess notation. 
Now we are prepared to discuss the equilibria of this model. 
There are several different equilibria that can arise in this model. 
two of which are competitive. 
The competitive equilibria occur for very large values of ~ 
and tor very small values of ~. This follows because if there is a 
* competitive equilibrium at (pL. qL). then for large values of~. it is 
possible to profitably deviate to the high quality market. Similarly 
* a competitive equilibrium at (pH. qH) is not stable for small values 
ot ~. The exact conditions are given in Lemma 10 of the Appendix. 
Of the different types on non-competitive equilibria two 
simple ones consist of price dispersion in one market with a 
competitive price in the other. and the others have price dispersion 
in both markets. Figure 6 indicates the ranges of ~ on which the 
various equilibria occur. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The most important observation from the models in the 
preceeding sections is that when there is imperfect information about 
quality. the incidence of quality deterioration in equilibrium 
increases. In the first moael. quality deterioration can be prevented 
by there being a sufficiently large proportion of shoppers. In the 
second model a badly behaved market can be improved by increasing the 
proportion of shoppers. or to some extent by reducing the proportion 
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denotes competitive equilibrium in the low quality market. 
NCH denotes noncompetitive equlibrl.um in the high quality market. 
NC
1 
denotes noncompetitive equilibrium in the low quality market. 
CEH denotes competitive equilibrium in the high quality market. 
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of consumers that are in1tially uninformed. The latter serves to 
eliminate quality deterioration but cannot, in general, eliminate 
non-competitive pricing. Nevertheless, improving the state of 
intormation among consumers has the effect of reducing the critical 
proportion of shoppers needed to achieve a competitive equilibrium. 
In the last model, more shopping cannot cure the suboptimal behavior 
of the market, instead the level of information among consumers must 
be increased. 
These models give us insight on two different types of state 
intervension: disclosure laws and other policies designed to reduce 
the cost of comparison and search; and educational plans to inform 
consumers, of which attributes are important in comparing products in 
a market. A third type of intervension that is often discussed is the 
regulation of product quality. Welfare can certainly be improved in 
all three models by regulation of product quality, when the cost is 
small enough. However, this idea assumes that the state knows the 
correct level of quality to allow in the market. Making this 
assumption is tantamount to assuming that the state knows the 
competitive prices, and then it might as well dictate both prices and 
quality. Thus qua1ity regulation is not a realistic remedy for 
markets with imperfectly informed consumers. 
Reducing the cost of comparison shopping through disclosure 
laws, uniform statement of terms and other standardization will 
certainly improve the equilibrium distribution whenever the consumer 
is able to comprehend the information or at least recognize the 
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difference when different quality products are encountered. Thus, it 
will benefit markets which can be described by the first two models, 
where there is learning by shopping. 
The problem with the consumers 1n the third model is that even 
if everything about the quality is disclosed, all specifications are 
stated in standard terms, the consumer is unable to understand, and 
more important, he is unable to distinguish between products of two 
different quality levels at the time of purchase. Examples of such 
markets might be insurance markets where the statement of the contract 
is so complicated that the consumer is unable to know which contract 
is better and which is worse. The appropriate policy for such a market 
is to educate the consumer so that he is able to make proper 
decisions. 
The most damaging aspect of this model is that the uninformed 
consumers also shop. Because they shop, and choose lower prices over 
higher prices it creates more demand in the low quality market where 
it is eas1er to offer lower prices. In fact if we observe the 
competitive equilibria as the sample size of the shoppers gets large 
we find that the range of ~ over which the competitive equilibria 
occur shrinks to just the two endpoints ~ = 0 and ~ = 1. The increase 
in shopping activity of the uninformed reduces the likelihood of a 
competitive equilibrium in the high quality market. Similarly, the 
increase in shopping among the informed consumers reduces the 
likelihood of the competitive equilibrium in the low quality markets. 
An area for further research would be to examine the effects of a 
127 
policy that would encourage the informed to shop more and the 
uninformed to shop less. Clearly this would increase the range of ~ 
in which the competitive equilibrium in the high quality market 
occurs. The effect of such a policy on the non-competitive equilibria 
needs to be examined. Finally it must be determined whether the 
policy is Pareto-improving. 
The last model can be alternatively interpreted as a model of 
heterogeneous tastes in a heterogeneous product market. That is, 
instead of the uninformed group having the same tastes as the 
informea, suppose they were actually informed and their behavior 
reflected their tastes. Then we have the result that all consumers 
are perfectly informed about quality and all consumers are shoppers 
and yet the market is badly behaved, simply because there are 
heterogeneous tastes. Another area of further research is to 
determine what sort of policies could improve the behavior of markets 
with heterogeneous products and heterogeneous tastes. 
The policy implications of these models should be taken with a 
little caution. We assumed quite specific ways in which information 
could be gained and we simply assumed in some models that a certain 
proportion of consumers was informed. Instead, a model endogenizing 
the state of information among consumers by formalizing the 
transmission ot information between consumers, such as reputation, or 
from firms to consumers, in the form of advertising may produce more 
accurate policy recommendations. 
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APPENDIX 
Theorem 1. The only competitive equilibrium is one with all 
• firms at (pH,qH). The necessary and sufficient condition for this 
F 
equilibrium to exist is 1-y ~ SH(~CL)' 
Proof: The other possible competitive equilibria are with ~ firms at 
• • (pL,qL) and nH firms at (pH,qH), nH # 1 (nL + na = 1). 
We will show by contradiction why these cannot occur. 
• Suppose in equilibrium there are ~ firms at (pL,qL) and nH 
• firms at (pH,qH), nH # 1 (nL + na = 1). 
• Then the following condition must be true at (pL,qL): 
SL 
This implies that a = --=---
1--y + 'Y~. 
Now let us see what condition must 
~ 1 = a(l-y) + 2ay(-- + -) = 
2 2 
= a(l+y~) 
a( 1--y + y + y~) 
But this is a contradiction. Thus we have shown that the other 
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possible competitive equilibria do not exist. 
Now let us determine the necessary and sufficient conditions 
• for competitive equilibrium to exist at (pH,qH). 
Suppose a firm attempted to deviate to any other location. 
Clearly it will receive its share of the non-shoppers. Of the 
shoppers that sample this firm, no one will purchase because the other 
• firm they would sample would offer (pH,qH), which is preferred by the 
shopper whether or not the deviant was offering high or low quality. 
Thus, the deviant will receive only the non-shoppers. Given that the 
deviant receives only non-shoppers, he can earn the most profit by 
selling at the highest price that non-shoppers would pay. Thus, a 
deviant would either locate at (R,qL) or (R,qH). Of these two 
locations, he would earn the most profit if he chose (R,qL) since 
between the two possibilities, the revenue is the same but the cost is 
greater for producing high quality than low quality. 
Hence the most profit is made by a deviant who locates at 
(R,qL). It follows that if it is not profitable to enter at (R,qL), 
then it is not profitable to enter at any other location in the 
feasible set. 
• Thus the configuration with all firms located at (pH,qH) is an 




Lemma !. In equilibrium, there cannot be any mass points except at 
competitive prices. 
Proof: Suppose in equilibrium there is a mass point at (p,q) of size 
m, m > 0, and p is not the competitive price for quality q. Then 
since it is an equilibrium 
D(p,q) = Z(p,q). 
Q) 
Choose a sequence {p- e.} such that there is no mass point 
1 i=l 
at (p - e i, q) and {p - e i }· converges to p. Such a sequence can be 
chosen since any distribution can have at most a countable number of 
mass points. Now, 
D(p- e.,q) L D(p,q) + aym 
1 
since of all the 2aym shoppers that choose (p,q) as their other draw, 
only one half will buy from a firm at (p,q), but all of them will buy 
from a firm at (p- e.,q). 
1 
If we take the limit as p- e. tends top, 
1 
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D(p - £ i, q) -7 D(p, q) + aym, but 
Z ( p - e . , q) -7 Z ( p, q) • 
1 
Thus, in a neighborhood of prices below p, the demand will exceed the 
break even demand. 
• FL 
No firms can exist at (p,qL) where p e [pL's- + ~). 
H 
Proof: Suppose in equilibrium there is firm at (p,qL) where 
• FL 




demand at (p8 ,q8 ) will be at least as large as D(p,qL) since each will 
receive their share of the non-shoppers and each shopper that 
• purchases from (p,qL) would necessarily purchase from (pH,qH) since 
• the latter is preferred. Thus D(p8 ,q8 ) L D(p,qL) = Z(p,qL). 
FL 
Now since p < -- + ~ and Z is decreasing in p, SH -L 
F 
Z(p,qLl > z<s~ + CL·qLl = 8a· 
But, this contradicts that we have an equilibrium. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma~. For every non-competitive equilibrium (R,qL) belongs to the 
F 
support of the equilibrium distribution, a= (R-CL)~l-y)' and 
s8(R-~) - FL 
'Y < SH(R-~) 
F 
• Det·ine p 
• 
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• If p > CL" then for 
P e (_b + 
SH 
CL" R-H+L) .. if p > p then no firm may locate at (p+H-L., q8 ) 
• and if p ( p .. no firm may locate 
F 
P e (_b + ~ .. R- H + L)., no firm 
SH 
Proof: Note the following fact. 
(p.,qL); • at if p > CL then for 
may locate at (p .. qL). 
F 
For any p e (_b + ~ .. R-H+L)., 
SH -L 
This is true for the following reasons. First both firms will receive 
their share of the non-shoppers which is the same. Second., suppose a 
shopper has sampled (p.,qL)" then in order that he purchase from this 
firm., his other sample must be a firm of low quality with price 
greater than p., or a firm of high quality with price greater than 
p+H-L. But now., if a consumer samples (p+H-L.,q8 ) and decides to buy 
from this firm the same conditions are required for the other sample. 
Thus the demand due to the shoppers is also the same for both firms. 
If in equilibrium firms may locate at (p.,qL) then it must be 
the case that 
Thus firms may not locate at (p+H-L.,q8 ) if Z(p.,qL) < Z(p+H-L.,q8 ). It 
follows .. similarly., that firms may not locate at (p.,qL) if 
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Now let us determine how Z(p,qL) and Z(p+H-L,qH) compare with 
one another by first determining when they are equal, and denote that 
• price by p • 
• Solving for p we find 
• p 
• • • If p > CL, for p > p , Z(p,qL) < Z(p+H-L,qH) and for p < p , 
• Z(p,qL) > Z(p+H-L,qH). If p < CL then z(p, qL) > z(p + H- L, qH). 
See Figures 6 and 7. 
Q.E.D • 
•• Lemma ~. Define p to be the positive solution to the quadratic 




FH = _____ ::;....__ 
p+H-L-~· 
•• For p e (R-H+L,L), if p > p , firms may not locate at (p+H-L,qH). 










cannot locate in 
cannot locate in 
price in high 
quality market. 
low quality market. 



















price in low 
quality market. 
~ : Firms cannot locate in the low quality market. 




To see this recall from Lemma 4, that if p £ (_h + ~, R-H+L), 
SH -L 
we would have that 
With p £ (R-H+L,L), the corresponding interval in which 
p + H- Lis located will be (R,H). 
Now since p + H - L > R, any non-shopper that samples this 
firm will not buy because the price is above his limit price. Thus, 
we need to subtract a(l-y). Of the shoppers who would buy at (p,qL) 
we lose all those whose other sample was also a high quality firm, 
since, now this shopper has seen only high quality firms, both of 
which offer a price above R which is his limit price. Thus we need to 
subtract 2aynH(l-GH(p+H-L)). And this explains the identity • 
•• Now suppose that p £ (p ,L) and in equilibrium there exist 
some firms at (p+H-L,qH). Let p + H- L be the highest price offered 
by these firms. Then GH(p+H-L) = 1. 
Z(p+H-L,gH) = D(p+H-L,qH). Recall that 
by the above argument, 
= D(p,qL) - a(l-y) 
since GH(p+H-L) = 1, 
Since this is an equilibrium 
since this is an equilibrium. Thus we need that 
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Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the two curves. From the figures we see 
•• that p > p is exactly the region where 
which is a contradiction. 
Q.E.D. 
A A FL 
De t ine p = <i + FH ( R - ~) • For p e (R- H + L,p), firms 
cannot locate at (p,qL) or (p + H- L,qH). 
A 




But this implies D(R,qH) > R _ C = Z(R,qH). 
H 
This cannot hold in equilibrium. 
Suppose there is a firm at (p + H- L,qH) and 
A ** R - H + L < p < p. Then p l p. In equilibrium, 
D(p + H- L,qH) = 2aynL(1- GL(p)) = ~(p + H- L,qH). 
** A A If p ~ p, then (1 - GL(p)) = (1 - GL(p)) since there are no 
A 
firms between R - H + L and p in the low quality market. But now 
A ** A A 
p ) p implies Z(p,qL) - a(1 - y) ~ Z(p + H- L,qH) < Z(p + H- L,qH) 
A A 
since p < p. Since it is an equilibrium, D(p,qL) = a(1 - y) 
A A A A 
+ 2aynL(l- GL(p)) ! Z(p,qL) or 2aynL(1- GL(p)) ! Z(p,qL) - a(1- y). 
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I 
z I Z(p+H-L,qH) 







- a(l-y) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _____ _ 
ct ~ pJ~'t +H-1 ~ H price in high 
1 
quality market. 
t~ <D .t Highest price in high 
quality market. 
FIGURE 9 
0 : Firms can be in high quality market. 
p* > R-H+L 
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z I Z(p+H-L,q ) . H 








cl ~ pj* +H-L H 
1 ~ CD .t Highest 
FIGURE 10 
Q) Firms can be in high quality market. 
price in low 
quality market. 
~ 
price in high 
quality market. 




Therefore, D(p + H- L,q8 ) = 2aynL(1- GL(p)) ! Z(p,qL) - a(1- y) 
< Z(p + H- L,q8), contradicting that there is a firm at 
( p + H - L, qH) • 
** A If p ) p then if there is a firm at (p + H- L,q8) 
D(p + H- L,q8) = 2aynL(1- GL(p)) = Z(p + H- L,q8). By the above 
A A 
argument there are no firms between p and p. Thus 2aynL(1 - GL(p)) = 
Z(p + H- L,q8). But now for any price p' + H- L greater than 
A 
p + H- L but less than p + H- L, D(p' + H- L,q8) = 
A 
2aynL(1- GL(p)) = ~(p + H- L,qH) > Z(p + H- L,q8), contradicting 
that this is an equilibrium. 
Q.E.D. 
S (R- ~) - F 
Finally, to show that y < H SH( R _ <i> L, we will argue by 
contradiction. Suppose there was a non-competitive equilibrium with 
S (R - c_) - F H -L L 
r l SH(R- ~) Then, by the previous argument, since it is a 
non-competitive equilibrium, (R, qL) must belong to the support of the 
FL 
distribution and a - -------=------
- (R- ~> (1 - r> • 
• Consider a firm entering at (p8 , qH). 
D(p;, qH) = a(l - y) + 2ay[(l - m) + ~] 
• where m is the size of the mass point at (p8 , q8 ), if any. Note that 
since it is a non-competitive equilibrium, m < 1. 
D(p;, q8 ) = a(l - r> + 2ay(1 - ~) 
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( R - CL) ( 1 - y) 
S8 (R- ~) - FL 
since y 2. SH(R _ ~) by assumption, 
• • In summary D(p8 , q8 ) > z(p8 , q8 ). This cannot hold in 
S8 (R- ~) - FL equilibrium and so by condraction we show that y < 
S8 (R - ~) 
Q.E.D. 
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The next five theorems describe the non-competitive equilibria 
that arise under five mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive sets 
of conditions on the technology and limit prices. In each case 
several different equilibria may occur depending on the proportion of 
shoppers to non-shoppers. Since they are non-competitive equilibria 




Theorem ~. * If R-H+L > p 
FL 
> SH + CL6 then one of the following is the 
equilibrium, depending on y. 
i) ~ = 16 nu = o 









• • 2 r 2 o. 
2(p -CL) + R-p 
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p > R 
• = 1 - .1..=1... [.lt:JL] 
1y~ p-CL 
R 2 p > p 
• 
P 2 P 
<= > 
iii) n = !::1.[ R-p •] n_. = 1 - n.. L 2y • , H L p-<i 
• p)p +H-L . -
p + H - L > p L p2 
p ) R 
• R 2 p > p 
• P 2 P 
1 
1 -x 1 [FH(R-11) 
- 2y(1-~) FL(p-Cu) 
GH(p) = 








(R-CL) 1 - 1j • (p -(1) 
(R-~) 
-1] • (p -CL) 
~ = 1-~ 
P > R 
-
R ~ P > p4 
• 
P 2 PH 
p < p 
• H 
• p)p +H-L 
. -
P + H - L ~ p 2 P3 
• Pu > P 
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<= > 
• • s8 (R-CL) - FL 2(p +H-L-C8 ) s8 (R-CL) - (p +H-L-C8 )FL - (R-CL>F8 




(R-CLl + (p*+H-L-SalFL- (R-CLlF
8 
Proof: i) Suppose 
• 
---.-=R~-~p-----. L 1 2 o. The condition that 
2(p -~)+R-P 
• R-p • • • L 1 is equivalent to p1 2 p • We will show that the 2(p -~)+R-p 
distribution given in i) is an equilibrium. For any equilibrium we 
need tha~on the support of the distribution, the demand equalf the 
break even demand. 
-Thus, for any p £ (R,p
1
) 
- __!i_ -= a(l-y) + 2a1[1-GL(p)] - p-~- Z(p,qL) 
If we solve for GL(p) we find that 
Next, for any equilibrium we need that the demand at any point 
not on the support of the distribution not exceed the break even 
demand at that point. In the low quality market, the prices not in 
the support of the distribution are those below p1 ~ For 
-P < P1 , D(p,qL) = D~pl,qL) = Z(pl,qL) < Z(p,qL) so firms cannot 
deviate to these points and earn a positive profit. In the high 
quality market none of the prices are in the support of the 
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distribution. Let us look at two cases • 
• First, for p > p + H-L 
D(p,q8 ) i D(p-H+L,qL) by Lemmas 4 and .5 
~ Z(p-H+L,qL) since firms cannot deviate to any point in 
the low quality market and earn a positive profit, 
• ~ Z(p,qH) by the definition of p • 
Thus, firms may not deviate to the high quality market at prices 
• greater than p + H-L • 
• Next for p ~ p + H-L. 
D(p,qH) = D(p-H+L,qL) by Lemma 4, 
= D(p1 ,qL) since there are no firms in the low quality 
market p e (p-H+L,p
1
), 
~ Z(pl +H-L, q8) since pl 
• ~ Z(p +H-L, qH) 
and equality holds only if pl = 
• 2 p 
• p and • p = p +H-L. Thus, rfirms may 
• not deviate to the high quality market at prices less than p +H-L. At 
• (p +H-L,qH) they just earn zero profit. 
Thus, we have shown that demand equals break even demand on 
the support of the distribution and at any point not on the support 
demand does not exceed the break even demand. Therefore this is an 
equilibrium. 
Suppose the distribution described in i) is an equilibrium 
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then we must show that 
• 
0 ~ y i ----.~R~-~P~----•• 
2(p -~) + R-p 
The condition that 0 ~ y always holds since y is assumed to lie 
between 0 and 1. 
• 
Suppose y > ----. _.:;;R=---..c;p ___ *, then we will show that the 
2(p -<;) + R-p 
distribution described in i) is not an equilibrium • 
y > 
• R-p 
• • 2(p -CL) + R-p 
• => pl < p • 
But this means that there exist firms in the low quality 
• market with prices below p • This contradicts Lemma 4. Thus 
y > 
• R-p 
• • implies that the distribution in i) is not an 
2(p -~) + R-p 
equilibrium. 
ii) 
SH( R-~) - FL R-p * 
Suppose SH(R-~) + ~ L y) • • 
-L -"L 2(p -~) + R-p 
we will show that the distribution given in case ii) is an 
equilibrium. 
• sufficient condition for p2 2 Pu· First we must show that for any 
point in the support of the distribution the demand equals the break 
even demand. 
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• Let us begin with the low quality market. For p s (p ,R), 
Solving for GL(p) we find that 
Now from Lemma 4, we know that firms cannot exist in the low 
• quality market at prices below p • But, if we substitute for ~ as 
• given, we find that GL(p ) = 0. Thus, demand equals break even demand 
on the support of the distribution, in the low quality market • 
• In the high quality market since p2 L pH there are no mass 
- . points in the distribution. Thus, for p £ (p2 ,p +B-L) 
-~ = a(1-y) . + 2aynL + 2ayn8 (1-G8 (p)) - p-C • 
B 
If we substitute for a, ~ and recall that ~ = 1 - ~ we 
arrive at the distribution given in case ii). Thus demand equals 
break even demand on the support. 
Next, for any point not on the support the actual demand must 
not exceed the break even demand, or equivalently it should not be 
profitable to deviate to a point not on the support of the 
• distribution. By the definition of p , it is not possible to deviate 
• to the high quality market at prices greater than p + B-L, or to the 
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) in the 
high quality market 
- -D(p,qH) = D(p2,qH) = Z(p2,qH) < Z(p,qH). 
Thus, profitable entry at this point is again not possible. 
Therefore, the distribution described in case ii) is an equilibrium. 
Now suppose the distribution given in case ii) is an 
equilibrium we will show that 
by contradiction. 
S8 (R-<i) - FL • 
First suppose r > 8 ( ) then p2 < Pn· But we know H R-<i + FL 
that firms cannot exist at these prices since they are below the 
minimum of the average cost. Thus this is clearly not an equilibrium 
distribution. 
Next suppose y < 
• R-p 
• • then ~ > 1, which is again 
2(p -~) + R-p 
not possible in equilibrium. 
Thus if the distribution given is an equilibrium then 
• R-p 
• •• 2(p -~) + R-p 
iii) Suppose r lies in the interval given in case iii), we will show 
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that the distribution defined in case iii) is the equilibrium. 
Clearly, GL(p) as defined in case iii) gives us the result 
that demand equals break even demand in the support of the 
distribution that lies in the low quality market. Similarly GH(p) 
guarantees that on its support demand equals break even demand for 
• Now for p = pH' we need that 
. -
But now G(pH) = G(p3). Thus, 
Recalling that ~ = ~r ~-p •1 we find 
1 lp -~ 
-<;. 








• Thus, as long as p
3 
~ p +H-L we have that zero profit is earned on the 
support of the distribution. 
From arguments presented in cases i) and ii), we know that 
positive profit cannot be made by deviating either to the low quality 
• market at prices below p or to the high quality market at prices 
• above p +H-L. The only additional region which is not in the support 
• of the distribution is for prices between pH and p3 in the high . -
quality market. For any p £ (pH,p
3
), 
and so deviation to these prices is not profitable. Thus, deviation 
to points not in the support of the distribution is not profitable and 
hence, the distribution in case iii) is an equilibrium. 
Now suppose the given distribution is an equilibrium, we must 
show that r must be in the range given in case iii). Suppose r does 
not lie in the above interval • 
• Then GH(pH) < 0 from the proof of ii) and so the distribution 
described in iii) will not be a proper distribution. 
• Next, if r lies above its upper limit, then p3 > p and again 
• G8 (pH) is not properly defined since it is not clear where the mass of 
• • • size 1-GH(pH) lies. If it lies at p then the demand just below p 
will increase disco~tinously, but the break even demand is continuous 
• in p so that it would be profitable to enter at prices just below p • 
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Thus, if y is not in the prescribed range, the distribution given in 
case iii) is not an equilibrium. 
iv) Suppose y lies in the range indicated in case iv) then we will 
show that the distribution given in case iv) is an equilibrium. 
Notice that y lying above the lower end point of its range is 
- . equivalent to p
4 
2 p • Clearly demand equals break even demand on the 
support of the distribution in the low quality market. In the high 
• quality market the only point in the support is at (pH,qH). 
FL 
This is clearly satisfied when a = -----=---- and n is as given in 
(R-~) (1-y) L 
the distribution. 
Next, we know that deviation to the high quality market at 
• • prices above p +H-L is not profitable. For p ~ p +H-L, 
-D(p,qH) = D(p4,qL) 
so firms cannot locate in the high quality market in this range of 
prices. 
Now, in the low quality market we know that firms may not . . -
exist below p • For p e (p ,p
4
) 
-D(p,qL) = D(p4 ,qL) = Z(p4 ,qL) < Z(p,qL). Therefore the distribution 
in case iv) is an equilibrium. 
1SS 
Now suppose we assume that the distribution given in case iv) 
is an equilibrium. We must show that y lies in the range specified. 
We show this by contradiction • If y lies below its lower limit, 
• • then p
4 
< p • But GL(p) is negative when p < p and so GL(p) is no 
longer a proper distribution, thus cannot be an equilibrium. If 
SH(R-C1) - FL 
Y > SH(R-<i) then ~ < 0, so again this is not a proper 
distribution. 
Therefore if the given distribution is an equilibrium, y lies 




If g- + CL 2 p > CL then one of the following is the 
H 





~ = 1 
!::l. 
2y [.lbl] p-~ 
( R - <i> ( 1 - y) 
=~+ y+1 
p > R 
p > p 
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ii) 
1 p > R 
0 
• 
GH(p) = ~ 
P 2 PH 
• 
Pu > P 
1 [SH(R- ~)(1- y) - FL] where n.. = -L y F I 
L 
(1- y)(R- ~)FL 
SH(R - ~) - FL SH(R - ~) - FL 
<= > S (R - c_) > y > S (R - c_) + F • 
H . -L H lL L 
Proof: i) The proof of this case is identical to that o£ Theorem 2, 
• FL 
The only difference is that since p i g- + CL, it is not 
H 
case i). 
• enough to impose p1 2 p • 
- FL 
We instead need that p1 2 -- + SH 
SH ( R _ ~) - FL . 
This condition is equivalent to SH(R _ ~) + FL L 1· 
~· 
ii) This case is identical to Theorem 2 case iv) with the 
- FL 
only difference that p4 > SH + ~· This is equivalent to 
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S (R - c._) - F 
W h < H -L L h. h . . d . t . e ave y 
88
(R _ ~) w 1c 1s a str1cter con 1 1on 
which quarantees that ~ > 0. 
equivalent to ~ < 1. 
Theorem 4. If 
i) • • p < CL or p > R - H + L 
A ** R - H + L ~ p ~ p < L ii) 
then one of the following is an equilibrium. 
i) n = 1 
L nu = o 
where p
1 
(R- ~) (1 - y) 
= ~ + y + 1 , 
<=> • •• ~ y 2 o. 
( 
. •• R - l2 
2 p - ~) + R- p 
Q.E.D. 




21~ P - cLj 
1 - _1=t_ ~H ( R - ~) ] 
2y~ lFL (p + H - L - SI 
1 - y [ R - p + H - L FH(R- ~)] 
2y (1 - ~) p - H + L - ~ FL (p - ~) 
-
p > R 
•• 
R 2 P > P .. -
p 2 p 2 p2 
•• p)p +H-L .. -
p + H - L 2 p 2 p2 + H - L 
p 2 + H - L > p 
-where p
2 is chosen so that GL(p2 ) = 0. 
_ 1=Y. • FH • (R- ~) (1 + y) 
~ - 2y FL ( R - ~) ( 1 - 'Y) + ( H - L - c
8 
+ ~) ( 1 + 'Y) 
(R - ~)FH - (R - ClJ>FL R _ P ** 





~ rR- pl 
1 - 2y~ l P - CL j 
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1 - f"Fu (R- ~> l 
1 - ~ I;- ----=--
21~ LFL (p + H - L - <lJJ 
0 
1- rFH (R - ~) 1 
where ~ = J:.::1.. - -A----=----
21 I FL (p + H - L - C_) 
L JH J 
p > R 
•• R 2 p ) p 
** A p 2 p 2 p 
A 
p > p 
•• p ) p +H-L 
** A p +H-L L p L p+H-L 
A 






1- !.....=....1. [R- pll 
2y~ p - 'iJ 
1 !.....=....1. f:u (R - ~> ] 
- 2y~ lFL (p + H - L - <=u> 
0 
p- R 
•• R 1 p > p 
•• A. 
P 2 P 1 P 
A. 
p > p 




p + H - L > p > R 
- . 
p4 L p L PH 
• Pa > P 
1 fFH (R- ~) l 
where ~ = .:L=.....I. 1- -A.----=---
2y lFL (p + H - L - <li> j 
_ (1 - y)F
8
(R - ~) 
P4 = en + 2(1 - y)S
8
(R- ~) - (1 + y)FL 
2S8 (R - ~) (R - en> - FL (R - en> - F8 (R - ~) s8 (R - <i> - FL 
<= > 2S8 (R - <i> (R - en> + FL (R - en> - F8 (R - <i> L y > S8 (R - <i> + FL 
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1 
1- !...-=__y [R- p] 
2y~ p- ~ 
GL(p) = 
1 - ~H (R - '1_) ] 1 - :L.::.....Y -




_ 1 - y [ R - p + H - L FH(R- ~)1 
2y(1-~) p-H+ L- ~- FL(p- ~) J 
[
R-; +H-L 
1 - 1 - y --~5 __ _ 
2y(1-~) -
Ps - H + L- ~ 
0 
<=> 
p > R 
•• R l P ) p 
•• p 
Ps 
-2 P l P5 
) p 
•• p ) p +H .. -
p +H-L 2 p 2 p5+H-L 
• 
P < Pu 
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L=_:t[R-pl 
- 2y~ p - ~j 
G =f 
H ~ 
p > R 
• 
P < Pa 
(1- y)(R- ~)FL 
p6 = ~ + 2(1- y)(R- ~)SH- (1 + y)FL 
Proof: i) This is identical to Theorem 2, case i) except that 
- .. 
p1 2 p • This is equivalent to 
•• 
p > •• •• - 'Y. 
R 
2(p - ~) + R - p 
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ii) 
(R- ~)FH- (R- cu>FL R- p** 
Suppose (R- CL>Fu + (R- cu>FL L y > 2(p •• - CL> + R- p ••• 
We must show that the given distribution is an equilibrium. For 
•• p 8 [p , R) 
Thus for demand to equal break even demand in the low quality market 
in this range ot prices, we need that 
- ** For p 8 (p
2
,p ) 
-as long as p
2 
2 R - H + L. 




or G - - L.::...l: __!! L) ~ 
(R- c.. l 
L(p) - 1 2y~ L (p + H - L- ~) J 
= a(1 - y) + p + H _ L _ C + 2ay~(1 - GH(p + H- L)) 
H 
1 - y [ FL FL FH l R - CL 
or GH(p + H - L) = 1 2y(1 - ~) P - CL R - ~ P + H - L - ~J FL 
1 - y [ R - p FH (R - ~) l 
= 1 - 2y(1 - ~) p - CL - FL (p + H - L- CH) J 
- .. 
for p £ (p2 ,p ). 
- .. Thus, for p £ (p
2 
+ H- L,p + H- L) 
Recall that all of the above is true as long as p2 L R - H + L. At 
- - -p2 , GL(p2 ) = 0 and at p2 + H- L, GH(p2 + H- L) = 0. Thus 
-D(p2 ,qL) = a(1 - y) + 2aynL + 2ay(1 - ~) = _ 
P2- CL 
-If we solve for p2 we find 
- 1 
P2 = ~ + 1 ~ ;(R - ~) • 
165 
(R - ~)F - (R - ~)F 
Notice now that (R - CL>F: + (R - cu>F~ 1 y is equivalent to 
FL(R- ~) A • 
p2 L CL + F = p 2 R - H + L (by the assumption that p < CL H 
• or p > R- H + L). Thus demand on the support of the distribution 
equals the break even demand. 
Now we must show that for points not on the support the break 
even demand is at least as large as the actual demand. 
-For the low quality market, we must look at prices below p
2
• 
For p < p2 
- -D(p,qL) = D(p2,qL) = Z(pL,qL) < Z(p,qL). 
-In the high quality market, for R < p < p2 + H - L 
- -D(p,qH) = D{p2 + H- L) = Z{p2 + H- L) < Z(p,q8). 
= a{l - y) + 2aynL + 2ay{l - ~) 
FL FL A -= a{l + y) = ~A since p ~ p2 - p-~ 
~-~ 
FH A 
= R _ ~ by the definition of p. 
Thus profitable entry is not possible at (R,q8). Finally for p < R, 
in the high quality market, 
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Thus at any point not on the support, profitable entry is not 
possible, and so the distribution described in case ii) is an 
equilibrium. 
Now suppose that the distribution is an equilibrium, we must show that 
(R- CL>FH - (R- <li>FL •• > 1 > ------~R~-~P~-------
(R - c_ )FH + (R - c_)FL - ( •• **. 
-L II 2 p - CL) + R - p 
This will be 
shown by contradiction. 
firms can profitably enter at (R,q8 ). So it is no longer an 
equilibrium. 
•• R - p Suppose 1 < ----.-.~::.,._-...~t:....-______ •_• 
2(p - CL> + R - p 
•• then p2 > p 
and the given distributions do not make sense since they assume that 
iii) Suppose 1 lies in the range described in case iii). , We must 
show that the given distribution is an equilibrium. 
D(R,q8) = a(l - 1> + 2a1nL = 
But now a(l - 1> + 2a1nL 
A. 
R - <11 =A. 
p- CL 




Thus p solves 
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A FL 
p = <i + FH (R - ~) 
A 
From case ii) we know that demand equals break even demand for p 2 p 
A 
in the low quality market, and for p > p + H - L in the high quality 
market. 
A 
Since there are no firms between R and p + H - L in the high 
quality market, we will now look at the high quality market for p ~ R • 
• For p e [pH" R] 
D(p,qH) = a(1- y) + 2ay(1- ~)(1- GH(p)) + 2ay~ = 
p- ~ 
= 
as long as p3 
a(1 - r> + 2ar~ = 
1 - 1 [FH . 1 -









CL FH • 
A 
R-
CH FL p + H -
CL 
L ,_ 





The condition that p
3 
2 pH is equivalent to the condition that r lies 
below the upper bound given in case iii). Thus the demand equals the 
break even demand at each point on the support. 
For points not on the support we need that the demand be less 
then or equal to the break even demand. Let us begin with the low 
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• quality market. For p ~ R - H + L < p we cannot have firms, by the 
• detinition ot p • For R- H + L < p < p, 
thus firms may not locate here and earn positive profit. In the high 
A. 
quality market, for R < p < p + H - L, 
so that profitable entry here is not possible. Finally for 
• 
PH < p < P3' 
-D(p,qH) = D(p3,qH) = Z(p3,qH) < Z(p,qH). 
Thus there is no point ot the support of the distribution where firms 
may enter and earn a positive profit. Hence, the given distribution 
is an equilibrium. 
Now if the given distribution is an equilibrium then we must 
show that r must lie in the specified range. 
• Suppose r lies above the upper end point. Then p3 < pH and 
the distribution is no longer proper. If r lies below the lower end 
point, .then 
A. A. 
D(p,qL) < Z(p,qL) by the argument in case ii). 
A. 
Since (p,qL) belongs to the support of the distribution, the 
distribution is no longer an equilibrium. 
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iv). Suppose y lies in the specified range. From arguments made in 
the previous cases, we know that demand equals break even demand for 
all prices in the support of the distribution in the low quality 
market. We also know this for the high quality market for prices 
• above and including p4 • The only point remaining is (pH,qH). 
= J 1 ( 1 - y! [s FL l - 2y(l - ~) H - R- ~ 
Thus demand equals break even demand on the support of the 
distribution. 
Next, for points not on the support, we need that demand is 
less than or equal to the break even demand. From previous arguments, 
-we know that this is the case for prices above p
4 
in the high quality 









~ R is equivalent to r being less than or equal to its 
• upper limit. Now for PH < p ~ P4 
- - -D{p,qH) = D{p4,qH) = Z{p4,qH) < Z{p,qH) 
and thus profitable entry is not possible. Hence, the given 
distribution is an equilibrium. 
If r lies above its upper limit then p
4 
> R and that will not 
properly define an equilibrium distribution. If r lies below its 




) will be negative which is again not a proper 
distribution. 
v) Again we can verify that demand equals break even demand on the 
support ot the distribution and is at most as large for points not on 
the support of the distribution. 






= a{l - y) + 2aynL + 2ay(l - ~) (1 -
2 
) • 
Thus SH = a{l - y) 
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1 -= a(l- y) + 2ar~ + 2[2ay(1- ~)(1- GH(p5 + H- L))] + 2y(1- ~) 






- .. Clearly we need p
5 
~ p and that gives us the upper limit for y. 
vi) This case is exactly as case iv) in Theorem 2. The only 
- .. 
difference is that we need p
6 
2 p This is guaranteed by the lower 
bound on y. The upper bound ensures that ~ is greater than zero. 
Theorem a_. If 
i) • p < CL or p > R - H + L 
A ** A ii) p > p or p > L 
then one of the following is an equilibrium 
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i) ~ = 1 nu = o 
= 1-1..=__y [R- p] 
2y p - ~ 
- (R- ~)(1- y) 
where p1 - ~ + (y + 1 ) 
ii) - 1..=__y nL - 2y 
A. 
<= > A. R - p > 'Y > 0 
2(p - ~) + R - ; - -
[ 
R- p 1 
P- c I 
LJ 
p > R 
~ = 1- ~ 
p > R 
A. 
R l p L p 
A. 
p > p 
p > R 
-= 1 - ( 1 - 1) FH [R - <i_ - R - ~] 
2y(1 - ~)FL p - ~ R- en R L p > p 2 
where ; = c_ + 1..=__y ~FH=-(_R_-_<i_....:=.-) 
2 II 1+y F 
L 
SH ( R - <i_) - FL A 
-=----=------!::! > > R - p 
SH ( R - <i_) + F L - 'Y A. A. 
2(p - <i_) + R - p 
iii) 
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F ( R - c._ ) - F ( R - c.__) _ L.::__y H "L L -H 
~ - 2y FL ( R - CiJ> ~ = 1- ~ 
1 
1 
1 - y ..J! -L "L F [R - c._ R - c._] 
- 2y(1-~) FL p- CiJ- R- CH 
F [R-c._ R-c._ll 1-y H -L -L 
1 - 2y(1-~) FL _ - R- '1! 
p3 - '11 j 
0 
p > R 
A 
R 2 P 2 P 
A 
p > p 
P > R 
• Pg ) p 
- FH(1- y)(R- CiJ> (R- CL> 
where P3 =en+ 2SH(1- y)(R- cn><R- <i> + FL(R- cn><1 + y) 
2 SH ( R - en) ( R - <i) - F L ( R - en) - F H ( R - <i) SH ( R - <i) - F L 
2sn<R- en> <R- CL> + FL<R- en> - Fn<R- <i> 2 r > sn<R- <i> + FL 
iv) 
p > R 
G () = 1-L.::__y [R- pl 
L p 2y~ p - <iJ 
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• 
P 2 Pu 
• 
P < Pu 
_ (1- y)(R- ~)FL 
P4 = ~ + 2(1- y)(R- ~)SH- (1 + y)FL 
Proof: i) Identical to case i) Theorem 4. Only difference is that 
ii) For p ~ R, 
FB 
Since a(1 - y) + 2ay~ = R _ Sa' we have 
= 1 - (1 - y) [R- ~ 
GB(p) 2y(1 - ~) p - en 
-To find p2 we solve GB(p) = 0. 
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1- FB(R- ~) - FL(R- en) 
where we have substituted for ~ = ~ • FL (R _ ~) • 




, and this is equivalent to 
iii) 
- .L.=...:t FB(R- CL> - FL (R- <1J> 
Recall that ~- 21 FL(R _ <1J> • Therefore, 
A. FL 
Substituting for p = ~ + FB(R- C8 ) we have 
F8 (R-CL) - FL (R-<1J> 
(R - ~) (R - <iJ> • 
-If we solve for p3 , we find 
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-Now we need p
3 
~ R, and this is equivalent to 
iv) This case is identical to Theorem 2 case iv). The only 
- A difference is that we need p
4 
2 p which accounts for the difference in 
the lower bound on y. 
Theorem §... If 
• • i) p < CL or p >R-H+L 
A •• ii) p < L < p 
then the following are equilibria. 
i) ~ = 1 
p > R 
1 - v[ R - p 1 GL(p) = ~ j - 2y p - CL 
0 
where ~+ 
{R- ~) (1 - y) 
p1 = (1 + y) 
A 
A 
<=> R- p 2 2 0, 'Y 
A A 
A A 












L::...1. H L F [ R - C... ] 
1 
- 2y~ FL p + H - L - <li 
0 
p > R 
A 
A 
p > p 2 L 
-L > p 2 P2 
p > H 
-H 2 p l p 2 + H - L 
-p2 + H - L > p 
L::...l: FH (R- ~) (1 + y) 
and ~ = 2y FL (R- <i> (1 - y) + (H- L- <JI + <i> (1 + y) 
nu=1-~ 
iii) 








(R - <i>FH + (R - tn>FL L 1 > 
A. A. 
" A. 2(p - ~) - R - p 
1 p > R 
[PR: sJ 
A. 









F [ R-~ ] 1 1-y_l! A. 
- 2y~ FL p + H - L - <if L > p 2 P 
A. 
0 p > p 
1 p > H 
[ R-p+H-L FH(R- ~)] A. 1 - 1=x H 2 PL p+H-L 
2y(1-~) p-H+L-~ - FL (p - <i> 
1 - 1=x [ A F (R- ~) l A. R- p H p+H-L 2 p 2 R 
; - ~ - FL (;+H-L-<if . 2y(1-~) 
1 - 1=x [F R- ~ FH. R- ~ l _1!. 
F p- <ii - FL ;+H-L-<11 - l J -2y(1-~) L R 2 P 2 P3 
0 -





1 - ..!..:::L -1 FH [ R- ~ ] 
2y~ FL p+H-L-<l! 
0 
0 
P > R 
A 
P > p 2 L 
A 
L > p 2 p 
A 
p > p 
p > H 
A 
p + H - L > p > R 
- . 
P4 2 P l PH 











where n. = !__::__y_ [FH __ <_R _-_<i-=->--1 
L 2y F A. j 
L (p + H - L - Cu> 
_ (1 - y)FH(R- .'i) 
P4 = Cu + 2(1 - y)SH(R- <i> - (1 - y)FL 
p > R 
A. 
A. 
p > p 2 L 
-
L > p 2 Ps 
-Ps > P 
p > H 
1 - 1 [ R-p+H-L FH(R - '1_)] -
p-H+L-<i- FL(p- ta> H L p 2 p5+H-L 2y(1-~) 
1 - 1 - • 2y(1-~) [~R-;5+H-L _ FH(: - '1_) l 
p5-H+~<i FL(p5 - Cu 
p5+H-L > P 2 Pu 
• 
P < Pu 
vi) 
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F R- <i 
where ~ = L::.._y • _J! • -----=~-
21 FL -
(p5 + H - L - <=u> 
- FL ( 1 - 1) ( R - <i) 
Ps = <i + 2SH(l- 1 )(R- <i> - (1 + 1>FL 
2SH(L - ~) (R - ~) - (L - ~)FL - (R- ~)FL 
2 SH { L - ~) { R - ~) + ( L - ~) F L - ( R - ~) FL L 1 
28 (R- f'_) (R- c__ - F {R- c__) - F (R- C...) 
H 'L --o) L -H H -L 
p > R 
-R 2 P 2 P6 
• 
p L PH 
• 
p < PH 
_ (1 - 1){R- ~)FL 
P6 = ~ + 2(1- 1)(R- ~)SH- (1 + 1>FL 
Sa(R - ~) - FL 288(1-~) (R-~) - (L-~)FL - (R-~)FL 
S8 (R- ~) > 
1 ) 2S8(L-~) (R-~) + (L-~)FL - (R-~)FL 
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Proof: i) This case is similar to case i) in all the previous 
A A 
A A 
theorems. What is interesting here is that p
1 
2 p, where p is the 
lowest price in the low quality market at which firms may exist, 
A 
A 





ii) In order that zero profit be made on the support of the 





Thus GL(p) = 1 - 2aynL p + H - L - Cu 
1 FH R- ~ 
= 1 - ..k:1... - -----=---
2y~ FL p + H - L - Cu 
as in Theorem 4 case ii. Also as in that theorem, 
= 
1 
_ 1 - y [ R - p + H - L _ FH (R- ~)] 
GH(p) 2y(l-~) p - H + L - ~ FL P - Cu • 
The value of p2 is computed in an identical fashion and the upper 
183 
A 
bound on y is generated by requiring that p2 2 p, which is also the 
condition required in Theorem 4 case ii). 
iii) This case is identical to Theorem 4 case iii). 
iv) This is identical to Theorem 4 case iv). 
v) Similarly this is identical to Theorem 4 case v). The only 
•• difference is that here we need p5 ~ L while there we need p5 ~ p 
vi) Again, the arguments are presented in Theorem 4 case vi). The 
A 
..... A 
only difference is that p6 2 p. 
Q.E.D. 
This completes the formal proofs associated with the basic 
model in Section 2. We will now present the formal arguments 
associated with the extensions of the basic model discussed in Section 
3. We begin with the first model in Section 3, where there is some 
learning through shopping and there are some naturally informed 
consumers. Next we will examine the final model discussed in Section 
3. In each case, the assumptions of the models will not be restated 
here as they are identical to the assumptions made in Section 3 • 
• Lemma 1. Competitive equilibrium at (p8 , q8 ) obtains if and only if 
each of the following holds: 
i) 
FL 
a(l - y) .i --=--
L- <i 
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ii) a(1 - y) ~ R _ ~ 
iii) a~(l - y) ~ H _ ~ 
iv) a(1 - ~)(1- y) ~ R _ ~ 
where a = SH. 
* Proof: Suppose all firms are at (pH, qH). This would be an 
equilibrium as long as no firm could deviate to any point in the 
feasible set and make a positive profit. Clearly condition i) 
guarantees that this is not possible for all prices below L in the low 
quality market. Similarly, condition ii) ensures this for p ~ R in 
the high quality market, condition iii) for p e (R,H) in the high 
quality market and condition iv) for p e (L,R) in the low quality 
market. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma !. Define 
For~<~~ every non-competitive equilibrium contains (R, qL), and 
there are no firms in the low quality market at prices between L and 
Proof: If we observe conditions i) to iv) of Lemma 7, we find that 
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for any P less than p, condition iv) is binding and the other three 
are slack. As in the previous model (and by the very same reasoning), 
• (pH, qH) is the only competitive equilibrium, and if any of the 
conditions of Lemma 7 do not hold then a non-competitive equilibrium 
obtains. Since iv) is the strictest condition when p < p, for every 
non-competitive equilibrium, condition iv) is violated. Thus (R, qL) 
is in the support of the equilibrium distribution. Finally as we 
approach from above, there is a discontinuous increase in demand at 
(L, qL) due to the entry of the informed consumers, who refuse to buy 
at prices above L. Thus there is an interval immediately above L 
where no firms may exist. The argument is identical to the one in 
Lemma 6, and clearly the interval is (L, p) where p satisfies 
L- CL 
The solution is p = CL + 1 _ ~ • 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma ~. Suppose the comparative advantage at limit prices lies in 
the low quality market. R- L For p greater than R _ ~ there are no firms 
at prices above L in the low quality market, in equilibrium. 
Proof: We argue by contradiction. R-L Suppose p > R _ ~ and there were 
firms at prices above L in the low quality market, in equilibrium. 
Then as we have argued before, the firm at the highest price would be 
at (R, qL). Since this is an equilibrium, 
(1 - p)(1 - y)a 
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FL 
and thus a = ----------~---------(R- ~)(1- ~)(1- y)· Now, consider (L, qL). 
D(L, qL) = a(1 - y) + 2ay(1 - GL(L)) 
2. a(1 - y) 
FL 
= -------=------
(R- ~) (1 - ~) 
FL 
> 
(R- c_)[1- R- L] 
-L R- ~ 
This contradicts that the distribution was an equilibrium. 
Q.E.D. 
The proofs of the conditions governing the cases that occur 
when the comparative advantage at limit prices lies in the high 
quality market use the same arguments that are used in Lemma 9. In 
equilibrium, positive profit cannot be made anywhere in the feasible 
set, and exactly zero profit can be made on the support of the 
distribution. Instead of proving each of the six cases separately, we 
shall discuss what creates the differences in each case. 
The most important aspect here, is which ·firm sells only to 
the non-shoppers. There are four candidates: (R, qL), (L, qL), 
(H, qH) and (R, qL). In each hypothetical case, a would be 
FL RL FH 
(R- ~)(1- ~)(1- y)' (L- ~)(1- y)' ~(H- CU)(1- y) 
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a . 
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and (R _ cu>< 1 _ y)' respectively. These are illustrated in Figures 
1 11 through 16 (without the factor of 1 _ y)· In order to satisfy the 
conditions for equilibrium, the correct 2 would be the minimum of the 
four candidates, and that in turn determines which firm sells to non-
shoppers only. If we observe the figures we see that there are three 
possible routes: i) (R, qL) to (H, qH), ii) (R, qL) to (L, qL) to 
(H, qH) and iii) (R, qL) to (R, qH) to (H, qH). 
Another important aspect is the changes in the gaps in the 
equilibrium distribution. At (L, qL) there is a discontinuity in 
demand due to the entry of the informed consumers and thus there is a 
gap in the equilibrium distribution for an interval just above L. We 
can show that this gap increases as ~ increases. Suppose initially ~ 
is small enough so that the firm for which the demand is due to non-
shoppers alone is (R, qL). The lowest price above L where firms can 
exist satisfies z(p, qL)/(1- ~) = z(L, qL). This follows from 
arguments made previously when discontinuities of demand were 
encountered. 
L- <i 
Thus, this price is 1 _ ~ + ~ which is clearly 
increasing in ~. There is a critical ~ above which this price exceeds 
R and so there are no firms above L in the low quality market. It 
follows that this critical ~ will be at the intersection of 
Fl FL 
which is denoted by R Thus for JS~ (R- CJ_)(1- ~) and L _ CJ. ~L. p ) 
there will be no firms above L in the low quality market. 
Similarly, it can be shown that the gap just above R in the 
high quality market, due to the uninformed consumers refusing to buy 
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at prices above R, reduces as the consumers become more informed. The 
gap vanishes completely only at ~ = 1, that is, then the discontinuity 
in demand at (R, qH) ceases to exist. 
Finally, the maximum price at which firms can exist in the 
high quality market increases with ~ and the minimum price at which 
firms can exist in the low quality market eventually increases with ~. 
Let us discuss the first claim. For p e (R- H + L, L], in 
equilibrium 
FH = _ _...;;;;;.__ 
p+H-L-<JJ • 
** Thus, at the highest price in the high quality market, p + H - L, 
** since GH(p + H- L) = 0, we have 
** D(p +H-L, qH) = FH ** ** . = D(p ,qL)-(1-~)a(l-y) = 
p +H-L-<JJ 
** - (1-~)a(l-y). 
p -<L 
** Clearly the price p which solves 
** ** 
(1 - ~)all - y) is increasing in ~ when 
p +H-L-<JJ p -<L 
the comparative advantage at limit prices lies in the high quality 
market. 
Similarly, it can be shown that the minimum price at which 
firms can exist in the low quality makret eventually increases with ~. 
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Thus, we have examined how changes in ~ affect three important 
aspects of the distribution: i) the firm which sells to the non-
shoppers alone, ii) the gaps in the distribution and iii) the maximum 
price in the high quality market and the minimum price in the low 
quality market. This gives us an intuitive idea of how the maximum 
support of equilibrium distribution behaves with the comparative 
advantage at limit prices, in the high quality market. 
The discussion that follows concerns the last model discussed 
in Section 3. The purpose here is not to provide complete rigorous 
proofs of all the equilibria but instead demonstrate how badly behaved 
the market can be even when all consumers are shopping. 
Lemma 10. The only competitive equilibria are either all firms at 
• • (pL, qL) or (pH' qH). The necessary and sufficient condition for the 
• competitive equilibrium at (pL, qL) is 
A / !. • F 
t~ ~ 2 F + SK ' e 
and the necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium 
~2.1-!.. F 
2 F + SK 
c 
• Proof: Suppose all the firms are located at (pL, qL) and a = S. For 
this to be an equilibrium, demand cannot exceed break even demand 
• anywhere on the feasible set. At prices greater than pL in the low 
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quality market, and prices above • PL + H - L in the high quality 
market, there is no demand since all shoppers prefer to buy at 
• • (pL, qL). At prices below PL + H - L in the high quality market, the 
• demand is due to the informed consumers. Thus, for p between pH and 
• pL + H- L 
in equilibrium. The strongest condition occurs at prices just below 
• • PL + H - L. Thus, there is a competitive equilibrium at (pL, qL) if 
and only if 
J3 ~ ..!... • 




F + SK • e 
• Similarly, the competitive equilibrium at (pH, q8 ) occurs as 
long as 
• • for p between pL and pH. Since this condition is strongest at prices 
• just below pH, the necessary and sufficient condition for a 
• competitive equilibrium at (p8 , qH) is 
1 -! • F 
2 F + SK 
c 
It is simple to show that there are no other competitive 
equilibria. Suppose there was a competitive equilibrium with mass 
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• • m, 0 < m < 1 at (pL, qL) and the complementary mass at (p8 , q8 ). Then 
D(p~, qL) = 2a<i + {1- ~)(1-m)) S 
= 2a( 1 - m + ~m) = S 
2 
For both equalities to hold simultaneously, we need ~ = t• 
which gives us a = S. Furthermore, since in equilibrium non-positive 
profit must be earned anywhere in the feasible set, 
• • D(p, qH) 2a{1- ~)(1-m) ~ Z(p, qH) , for pH < p < pL + H- L. 
These inequalities are equivalent to 
~ ~ l 
F < l 2m F + SK0 2 
and 1 F > l ~ l 2(1 - m) F + SK 2. 
c 
Clearly, ~ cannot simultaneously satisfy all these conditions and so 
there are no such equilibria. 
Q.E.D. 
We will discuss the non-competitive equilibria informally, as 
the main objective in presenting this model is to demonstrate how 
badly behaved the market equilibria are even when everyone is 
shopping. We classify the equilibria according to complexity, and 
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find that there are two simple equilibria with competitive pricing in 
one market and price dispersion in the other market. Finally there 
are equilibria with dispersion in both markets. In what follows we 
discuss two simple non-competitive equilibria and discuss the 
conditions under which the more complicated equilibria arise • 
• Let us begin with the equilibrium with mass at (pH' qH) and 
price dispersion in the low quality market. Since there is a mass 
• point at (pH, qH) there will be a discontinuous increase in demand as 
• • we move from prices above pH to pH in the low quality market and 
• another discontinuous increase in demand as we move to prices below pH 
in the low quality market. Since demand cannot exceed the break even 
demand in equilibrium, and break even demand is continuous in prices, 
we cannot have any firms in the low quality market at prices at or 
• above pH. • • Thus the support of the distribution lies within pL and pH 
in the low quality market. 
The demand at the highest price in the low quality market is 
a(l • ~)nH (where nH is the size of the mass at (pH' qH)) as long as 
• the price is less than pH. Thus firms can exist at prices just below 
• PH· 
In equilibrium demand equals break even demand on the support 
• of the distribution. We will impose this condition at (pH, qH), 
• • (pL, qL) and (pL, qL), where pL is just below pH to solve for the 
parameters of the distributions. Then we can define the distribution 
• GL(p) between pL and pL such that demand equals break even demand. 
A * Define GL to be the size of the mass point (if any) at (pL' qL). 
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Then, 
We can solve these three equations simultaneously using the fact that 
~ + llg = 1. 




S[2(F + SK )(1- ~) + F(1~- 1)] 
c 
4~(1 - ~)(F + SK ) 
c 
A [ 2~(1 - ~)SK ] 
6L = 2 1 - 2(F + SKc)(1 - ~~ - F • 
• • Now we can define GL(p) for pL < P < Pu· 
Thus, 
GL(p) = 1- 2a~ [ p !cL- 2a(l-jl)(l- "-)] • 
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In order that this be a non-competitive equilibrium we need that 
A A 
0 < ~ < 1, 0 ~ GL < 1. If GH = 0 then GL(p) is the above expression 
whenever it is greater than zero and GL(p) = 0 otherwise. We define 
..., A 
pL to be the highest price such that GL(pL) = 0. If GL F 0 we need to 
..., ..., A 
find pL such that GH(p) = GL. Then, we define GL(p) to be the 
..., * A * 
function given above for pL ~ p < pH and GL(p) = GL for PL i P < pL. 
It is straightforward to show that the condition that ~ < 1 
is always satisfied. The condition that 0 < ~ is equivalent to 
~ < 1 1 F 2 F + SK • 
c 
A A 
Finally, 0 ~ GL and GL < 1 give us the following quadratic conditions 
in ~, respectively 
0 < 4SK ~2 - 2[F + 3SK ]~ + F + 2SK • c c c 
These parabolas are illustrated in Figure 17. 
If ~ satisfies these conditions, then the conditions for 
• equilibrium are satisfied for all prices below pH in both markets. 
The last condition to check is that no fir.ms can enter at prices above 
• PH in either market. • Clearly no one will buy at prices above pH in 
• the low quality market and no one will buy at prices above pH + H - L 
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must check whether positive profit can be earned. For the case when 
• there is a mass point at (pL, qL), the four regions 
• • • • PH < p < PL + H - L, p = PL + H - L, pL + H - L < p < pL + H - L and 
• pL + H - L ~ p < pH + H - L are shown in Figure 18 as regions A, B, C, 
and D respectively. When there is no mass point, there are only two 
• • regions: A, PH < p < PL' and D, PL ~ p < PH + H - L. 
Notice that in regions A and C, demand is constant, but break 
even demand is smallest at the upper end point. Thus, for these 
regions, it is enough to check that positive profit cannot be made at 
the end points. For region C this point is (pL + H - L, qH) which is 
in region D. For region A, since demand jumps discontinuous at B, a 
limiting argument indicates that we should compare the demand in 
region A with the break even demand at B, to generate the strongest 
condition. Clearly if this condition is satisfied then positive 
profit cannot be earned at B also. 
Thus, 
D(region A) = 
Substituting for a and ~ and solving tor ~ we find 
F(F + SK9 ) 1 - 2(F + SK )SK < ~ 
c 9 
From the assumptions of the model, it is not clear whether this is 
A 
stronger than GL < 1. 
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Finally we must determine where the strongest condition is 
• imposed in region D. For PL < p < p8 , 
In equilibrium we need that 
D ( p + H - L, qH) 
Now 2a(1- ~)(1- ~) 
1 s 
F +SFSK , and thus we need that 
c 
F + SK 
c 
< 1 
p + H - L - ch' 
or~~ (p + H- L- c )(F S S) H + CH - p 
F 
Clearly the right hand side is increasing in p and thus the strongest 
condition will be imposed at p = pL. This condition is quite 
1 F complicated but it is always weaker than ~ ~ 1 - 2F + SK whenever 
c 
A similar analysis for the equilibrium with competitive price 
in the low quality market and price dispersion in the high quality 
market gives us the following distribution 
= 2(1 - B)F 1 - 2(F + SKe)~ - F(2~ - 1) 
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S[2tF + SK9)~ - F(2~ - 1)] = a 
4~(1 - ~)(F + SK9 ) 
A. 2~(1 - ~)SK9 
GH = 2 1 - 2(F + SK9)~ - F 
GH(p) 
1 F 
= 1--- - 2a~(l - ~) 
2a~ p - CH 
A. 
If GH = 0 then GH(p) is the above expression whenever it is greater 
-than zero, and zero otherwise. We define pH such that GH(p) = 0. If 
A. - A. 
GH ) 0 then we define pH to be the price at which GH(pH) = GH. Then 
- . we define GH(p) to be the above expression for pH~ p < pL + H - L and 
A. A. 
The conditions 0 < ~· 0 ~ GH and GH < 1 
are equivalent to 
~ 2. !. F 
2 F + SK
9 
and 
0 > 4~ 2 sK9 + 2~(F - SK9 ) - F ,respectively. 
These conditions are illustrated in }4'igure 19. The condition that 
~ < 1 is always satisfied. 
Finally the condition that non-positive profit be earned for 
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• • prices above pL + H - L in the high quality market and above pL in the 
low quality market gives the following conditions on ~. 
F(F + SK ) 
~ < 2(F + SKe)SKc 
Again the right hand side is increasing in p and thus the 
strongest condition is at p = pH and is quite complicated. It is 
1 F * always weaker than ~ L 2 F + SK if pH - H + L > cL. 
e 
The final type of non-competitive equilibrium is where there 
is price dispersion in both quality levels. The first equilibrium of 
• • this sort has a maximum support of (pL, pH) in the low quality market 
• • and (pH, pL + H - L) in the high quality market. Clearly it will 
exist on values of ~ where entry is possible in this price range; 
these are exactly those values of ~ where the previous equilibrium 
• does not exist. There may or may not be mass points at (pL, qL) and 
• (pH, qH) depending on ~. Again there will be some stability 
conditions, that is conditions requiring that non-positive profit be 
earned off the maximum support. If these conditions are binding, then 
there is another non-competitive equilibrium with dispersion in both 
quality levels. The difference is that the maximum support is larger. 
It may include, in addition to the previous maximum support, 
• • • • (pH, pL + H - L) in the low quality market or (pL + H - L, pH + H - L) 
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in the high quality market or both, depending on which of the 
stability conditions is binding. Notice that in this equilibrium we 
• • • cannot have a mass point at (pL, qL) if (pL + H - L, pH + H - L) in 
the high quality market is in the support, and we cannot have a mass 
• • • point at (pH' qH) if (pH' pL + H - L) in the low quality market is in 
the support of the distribution, since the mass points cause 
discontinuities in demand in the other market and the support cannot 
include points of discontinuity of demand in its interior. Clearly 
this equilibrium will also have stability conditions and if they are 
binding we will have to find still another non-competitive equilibrium 
with a larger support. This process will go on until the range of ~ 
is exhausted. 
Note also that if pL is the maximum price in the low quality 
market and pH is the maximum price in the high quality market, then we 
must have that pL < pH < pL + H - L. If pL > pH then for p e (pL' pH) 
in the low quality market, the demand is zero similarly, there is no 
demand at prices between pH and pL + H - L when pH > pL + H - L. 
